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Advanced Military Training-2 2022

“Security Challenges and Military issues in the EU – Military Planning Concept at the Political and Strategic Level”

Thessaloniki, 8 April 2022

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends,

Thank you very much for the invitation to participate in your Course. It's an honour and a privilege to be in the mentoring team of the ESDC.

The Outline of my briefing is on the screen.

At the end of the security briefing, I have added a very short and concise briefing on the Military Planning Concept at the Political and Strategic Level.

At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the global security situation deteriorated. The overall security landscape has become more volatile, complex, and more fragmented than ever, due to multi-layered threats.

Today, the EU is surrounded by instability, hybrid threats, cyber and organized crime challenges, and local conflicts, and in addition faces a war on its borders. The COVID pandemic has worsened the situation. Financial instability, extreme social and economic divergences can further exacerbate such dynamics and have a growing impact on our security. All of these threats undermine EU security along our southern and eastern

borders and beyond. Where the EU is not active and effective in promoting its interests, others fill the space.

But what is most worrying in the long run, is the revisionist policies of Russia, Turkey and China, which are aggressively seeking a new role to revive their long-lost imperial past. All of them move in parallel and roughly on the same lines of a common narrative on the injustice of the world against their own people who are blocked in the way to their destiny. These revisionist approaches eventually led to the formulation of aggressive strategies, like the one we witness in Ukraine.

Through the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine, Russia is grossly violating international law and the principles of the UN Charter and undermining European and global security and stability. This follows the military aggression in Georgia in 2008, as well as the illegal annexation of Crimea and the military intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014.

Through this armed interference in Georgia and Ukraine, the de facto control over Belarus, as well as the continued presence of Russian troops in protracted conflicts, including in the Republic of Moldova, the Russian government is trying to amend the post-Cold War Security Architecture in Europe by reestablishing or reclaiming the Soviet sphere of influence they lost in 1990 when the Soviet Union collapsed. The armed aggression against Ukraine is showing its readiness to use the highest level of military force, regardless of legal or humanitarian considerations, always combined with hybrid tactics, cyber attacks and foreign information manipulation and interference, economic and energy coercion and an aggressive nuclear rhetoric. These aggressive and revisionist actions for which the Russian government, together with its accomplice Belarus, is entirely responsible, severely and directly threaten the European security order and the security of European citizens. Those responsible for these crimes, including targeting civilians and civilian objects, will be held accountable. In other theatres such as Libya, Syria, Central African Republic and Mali, Russia also projects itself and uses crises in an opportunistic way, including by using disinformation and mercenaries, such as the

Wagner group. All these developments constitute a long-term and direct threat for European security, which we will continue to face resolutely.

I personally believe that the possibility of connection or accession of Ukraine to the EU concerns Putin more than the proximity to NATO borders. Ukraine's immense resources and the unique potential of Ukrainian industrial and agricultural infrastructure with the support of the EU may turn Ukraine into a prosperous and rich country. However, a prosperous, democratic and State of Law Ukraine, threatens Putin's regime far more than NATO's controversial missiles, and its authoritarian political power grip will be put in danger, following a possible and maybe inevitable awakening of its people.

Turkey, the other revisionist force of the area is also a point of concern for the EU. The rising tensions and the confrontation of Turkey with Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea are well known to the international community. The delimitation of the continental shelf is the only difference with Turkey officially recognized by Greece. The options offered as usual by the Turks to their opponents are always the same that they offer: Concede or Fight, but in this occasion, the capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces make the situation complicated and dangerous for the Turkish deep state establishment which is promoting this hardline stance. On the other hand, one thing we should always keep in mind is that the borders under discussion are not exclusively Greek, but they are also EU borders. This is the main reason for the recent transformation of the Greek Turkish border and migration issues into EU Turkish issues, a development that made the Turks very unhappy.

One of the most puzzling issues the EU faces is its relations with China. China is at the same time a partner, for instance on climate action; a competitor, notably in economic terms; and a rival, with China actively promoting alternative forms of governance and expanding its sphere of influence. China has been substantially developing its military means and aims to have completed the overall modernisation of its armed forces by 2035, impacting regional and global security. China's development and integration into its region, and the world at large, will mark the rest of this century. We need to ensure

that this happens in a way that will contribute to uphold global security and not contradict the rules-based international order and our interests and values. This requires strong unity amongst us and working closely with other regional and global partners.

However, it is necessary to clarify some very important points from the beginning. First and foremost, for the EU MS, national defence and security are national responsibilities. The MS have to be able to defend their own territory and their sovereignty. In order to be able to do so, 21 out of the 27 EU MS participate in NATO, which takes responsibility of the Collective Defence of its members. Collective Defence of Europe therefore is a NATO responsibility. This has not changed and will not change in the foreseeable future. NATO is expected to present for agreement by the Heads of States its new Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit at the end of June 2022.

But for Greece and Cyprus NATO and EU roles have a completely different meaning: (1) Cyprus is not a NATO ally and therefore is not protected by NATO against any threat, (2) Greece is a NATO ally but in a confrontation with Turkey, NATO is not expected to take sides and subsequently Greece is not protected by the Alliance either; (3) EU remains the only “potential ally” for both countries.

Moving back to 2016, when the EU launched the EU Global Strategy (EUGS).

With the adoption of this Strategy, the EU has taken some important decisions related to security and stability, such as CARD and PESCO.

For the first time in EU's history, the EU 2021-27 Budget features a section on defence and security. In a radical break from the past, EU leaders have agreed on the much-needed financial basis for further EU defence cooperation and now the agreed EU budget includes the following defence items as you can see on the screen:

- European Defence Fund (EDF): €7,014 billion –
- Military mobility, a project in support of NATO: €1,5 billion –

- European Peace Facility (EPF): €5 billion – A new, off-budget instrument to finance actions in the field of security and defence.
- In December 21, EU announced that with a budget of almost 900 million Euros, the “*Global Europe thematic programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention*” will support actions with a global or trans-regional impact during the period of 2021-2027.

In order to achieve the objectives of this Strategy, a Policy known as the Integrated Approach Policy was developed and the EU, in order to implement it, relied on a large and unique set of policy tools, from the political to the diplomatic sector and from economic to military power.

Having said that, I believe we should not forget the two articles existing in the Treaties that could be invoked by a victim of aggression. I refer to Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (solidarity clause), and to Article 42.7 of the Treaty of the European Union (mutual assistance clause). This course of action, given the situation in the area, deserves further consideration by the political leaderships of various MS, Cyprus and Greece included.

These projects give flesh to a new term recently coined, EU's Strategic Autonomy. The idea of this European strategic sovereignty is to “*avoid external dependencies in a new geopolitical context*”. With this, we don't mean Autonomy from any nation or international organization, but Autonomy to do something alone, if necessary. In the meantime, while many may dispute the term ‘Strategic Autonomy’ (the US being the first among them) there is a growing realization that the EU must have a capacity to act without undue dependences in terms of capabilities, technologies, and political decision-making. To be more realistic and under the light of the tragic turn of events in Afghanistan and Ukraine,

it is now clear that EU Strategic Autonomy isn't about Europe separating from the US; but about Europe being able to act, when the US or NATO are uninterested, unwilling, or incapable to do so. And it is becoming increasingly easy to see scenarios in the Mid-

dle East or Africa where EU security and interests are in danger, but the US has little or no interest at all to act.

This is leading us to another EU turning point. It is called Strategic Compass and it was discussed more than one year in Brussels. This will be the document that will update and upgrade the EUGS without cancelling it and will bring it up to today's global geopolitical requirements, because in this highly confrontational system, the EU and its Member States suddenly realized that they should invest more in their security and defence in order to be a stronger political and security actor.

For the last decades the EU and its MS believed that the solution for establishing good relationship with Russia was the further development of the financial and political relations through common interests and mutual benefits. They believed that easy or free movement of goods and capitals would further "open" and bring closer Russia to the EU and persuade Mr. Putin to choose democracy, dialogue and cooperation instead of threats, confrontation and conflict. To this end, Europe agreed to be depended to the Russian gas and to further invest in Russia. Obviously, this was a misunderstanding leading to a wrong assessment by the West. Good economy is not necessary contributing to peace. Sometimes the opposite is happening. Financing adventurism or revisionism is easier when based on a good and flourishing economy. A lot of times, we have seen this also in the past, authoritarian leaders make choices that ignore economic interests or cost and financial implications or even hardship for their people preferring to follow their nationalistic or imperialistic, geopolitical visions and territorial aspirations.

This is what is happening nowadays in Europe. Suddenly, we realize that we need a quantum leap forward to develop a stronger and more capable European Union that acts as a security provider, building upon the Union's fundamental values as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty on EU. We can only do so, based on a shared threat assessment and a joint commitment to action. This is what Strategic Compass is all about.

With this project, we set out a common strategic vision for EU security and defence policy over the next 5-10 years and will immediately start its implementation. This will help us build a common strategic culture, strengthen our unity and solidarity and, above all, enhance our capacity and willingness to act together, to protect our interests and defend our values. To that end, it identifies clear goals in the area of EU security and defence, the means to achieve them and specific timelines along which we can measure progress. The objective of the Strategic Compass is to make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider. This Strategic Compass will also enhance the EU's Strategic Autonomy and its ability to work with partners to safeguard its values and interests.

The strength of our Union lies in unity, solidarity, and determination. A stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of Collective Defence for its members. The Compass will also intensify support for the global rules-based order, with the United Nations at its core.

Last week the EU Council has formally approved this Strategic Compass. On the screen you may read the statement of HR/VP Borrell, "The threats are rising, and the cost of inaction is clear. The Strategic Compass is a guide for action. It sets out an ambitious way forward for our security and defence policy for the next decade. It will help us face our security responsibilities, in front of our citizens and the rest of the world. If not now, then when?"

The Compass gives the EU an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030. The document makes concrete and actionable proposals, with a very precise timetable for implementation, in order to improve the EU's ability to act decisively in crises and to defend its security and its citizens. The Compass covers all the aspects of the security and defence policy and is structured around four pillars: **act**, **invest**, **partner** and **secure**. On the screen you may see the concrete actions foreseen for each pillar.

- **Act**

In order to be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone, when necessary, the EU will:

- establish by 2025 a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops for different types of crises.
- be ready to deploy by mid 2023, 200 fully equipped CSDP mission experts within 30 days, including in complex environments.
- conduct regular live exercises on land and at sea starting from 2023.
- enhance military mobility starting from the end of 2022.
- reinforce the EU's civilian and military CSDP missions and operations by promoting a rapid and more flexible decision-making process, acting in a more robust way and ensuring greater financial solidarity.
- make full use of the European Peace Facility to support partners.

- **Secure**

In order to strengthen its ability to anticipate, deter and respond to current and fast-emerging threats and challenges, and safeguard the EU's security interest, the EU will:

- boost its intelligence analysis capacities.
- develop Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams bringing together different instruments to detect and respond to a broad range of hybrid threats.
- further develop the Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox and set up an EU Cyber Defence Policy to be better prepared for and respond to cyberattacks.
- develop a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox.
- develop an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence.
- strengthen the EU's role as a maritime security actor.

- **Invest**

Member states have committed to substantially enhance their defence expenditures to match our collective ambition to reduce critical military and civilian capability gaps and strengthen our European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. The EU will:

- exchange on national objectives on increased and improved defence spending to match our security needs.
- provide further incentives for member states to engage in collaborative capability development and jointly invest in strategic enablers and next generation capabilities to operate on land, at sea, in the air, in the cyber domain and in outer space.
- boost defence technological innovation to fill strategic gaps and reduce technological and industrial dependencies.

- **Partner**

In order to address common threats and challenges, the EU will:

- strengthen cooperation with strategic partners such as NATO, the UN and regional partners, including the OSCE, AU and ASEAN.
- develop more tailored bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries and strategic partners, such as the US, Canada, Norway, the UK, Japan and others.
- develop tailored partnerships in the Western Balkans, our eastern and southern neighborhood, Africa, Asia and Latin America, including through enhancing dialogue and cooperation, promoting participation in CSDP missions and operations and supporting capacity- building.

Turning now to the present EU security on the ground related activity. On the screen you can see where the EU is currently engaged, in three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia). I will not examine the great job and the results or the outcome of the eleven civilian missions and FRONTEX, but I will restrict myself only to military missions. As military we are involved in three Executive Operations and four Non-Executive Missions.

The Operations include ALTHEA, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, contributing to a safe and secure environment, Operation ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, protecting vulnerable shipping from piracy at sea, and Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean, dealing with the implementation of the UN arms embargo at the high seas off the coast of Libya.

Last January, the EU Council launched the first pilot case of the new Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept in the Gulf of Guinea which is the area that accounts for 95% of maritime kidnappings in the world. France, Italy and Spain are already in the Gulf of Guinea providing naval and air support to support the pilot operation. In February 2022, the Council extended the operation in the Gulf of Guinea for a further two years until February 2024 and decided to launch a similar Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) operation in the North-West Indian Ocean from the Hormuz Straights to the South Tropics and the North Red Sea to the centre of the Indian Ocean. The expansion of the CMP at the Indo-Pacific will be followed later by the East China Sea.

EU military training missions in Mali, the Central African Republic and Somalia, and most recently in Mozambique, provide training to the local armed forces and advice to their military leadership.

In this context and due to internal political developments, as we mentioned before Russia also projects itself and uses local crises in an opportunistic way, including by using disinformation and mercenaries, such as the Wagner group. All these developments constitute a long-term and direct threat for European security, which we will continue to face resolutely Russian intervention.

Increasing the level of ambition for these missions, the need was recognized and in 2017 a separate executive and administrative structure was created, known as the Military Planning and Conducting Capability Cell (MPCC), which is actually a Brussels-based Operations Headquarters within the EU Military Staff, which manages all the above non-executive missions. By 2025 the MPCC will be able to plan and to conduct all nonexecutive missions as well as two small scale or one medium scale operation as well as live exercises.

Turning now to the relationship between EU and NATO, the two organizations have to cooperate in order to promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Their relationship should be examined at three levels of debate: (1) Relationship and complementarity between the two organizations; (2) What the EU MS should be doing within NATO; and (3) The broader transatlantic bond which also includes the transatlantic relation with the US.

This is not a zero-sum game, where putting more resources within the EU means taking them away from NATO but could be definitely a win-win situation for both Organisations. In fact, since strengthening the European pillar is also a clear strategic goal for NATO itself and a long-lasting demand by the US, then it is clear that the EU defence initiatives are not undermining NATO, but rather reinforcing it. NATO should concentrate on Collective Defence, while the EU should be in the lead for all crisis management, human security and human rights related issues. The key words of EU-NATO relationship are mutual reinforcement and burden sharing.

Russia's outrageous attack on Ukraine was a shock but beside this, in recent days we have witnessed the belated birth of geopolitical Europe. The one we have been talking about for years: with a sense of purpose and using all means and leverage to support its political goals.

The EU acted extremely quickly and with unprecedented determination, breaking many taboos. Undoubtedly, we have gone further in a week than in decades of discussions. All this proves that when the crisis strikes, Europeans do come together and invoke and develop a strong collective will to defend their values and interests from any form of attack. It seems that Europeans are ready to pay any price required, in addition to various economic measures and sanctions. The price to pay is the price of freedom.

EU also agreed within a few hours to use the EPF to bring financial support and to coordinate the efforts of the MS to supply weapons to the Ukrainian Army to help the country defend itself against Russian aggression. As this is a full-scale war and Ukraine has every right to defend itself, we must support it with the means needed for this self-defense. We have decided to use the European Peace Facility to provide € 450 million worth of lethal weapons equipment and € 50 million in non-lethal supplies (such as fuel and protective equipment). These measures will be fully consistent with what the EU MS have already decided to do on a national basis. This is the first time the EU has provided lethal military equipment to an attacking country. To this end, the HR/VP Borrell has set up within the EU Military Staff a Clearing House to liaise and support EU actors with the Ukrainian Armed Forces in matters relating to EU military assistance or

from the various (MS or not) countries bilaterally and to ensure the timely promotion of any assistance available. European Heads of government decided last week to offer to Ukraine additional assistance of 500 M euros, raising the full amount of military assistance to 1 bn euros.

Moreover, given Russia's unique capabilities in the Hybrid War and the fact that cyber operations are vital, the work of the PESCO Cyber Rapid Response Teams was activated so that the European Commission could provide equipment, software and other formats and assistance to strengthen cyber resilience in Ukraine.

This is a critical moment for the EU. It is also time for the European Union to discuss and decide what it wants to be. Strategic Compass is a good start and it's pushing EU towards this direction. To quote High Representative/Vice President of the Commission Josep Borrell: «We need to put more defence and security in our mentality and stop the theological debates about strategic autonomy. We can call it whatever we want, but we have to take our security into our own hands. This war will also force us to increase our defence spending. We need to spend more but above all we need to spend better....

This approach has nothing to do with weakening the transatlantic link, which, by the way is stronger than ever... To avoid being at the mercy of the others, needs to become a truly global actor. To enhance its power, Europe must strengthen its existing levers and look for new ones....”.

I couldn't agree more. Concluding, I would like to share with you my personal view: Europe is our home, and the EU is our family. A family always need protection. Strategic Compass, if properly followed, may turn EU to a stronger global security actor, in order to protect our principles, our interests, our people and our way of living.

Dear friends, we deserve a stronger Europe. We have now a wide-open window of opportunity. Let's make it happen!

We turn now to the second part.

I stop here my security briefing and I am turning to the second part of my briefing related to the Military Planning Concept. This concept defines the military planning activities within the overall Planning Process in implementation of the previously explained Integrated Approach Policy.

Military Planning as part of the general EU planning is a process which needs to analyse all relevant factors to shape the military mission in order to achieve specific EU political/military objectives. At the political and strategic level this will include analysis of the implication of political objectives, the desired EU end state, restraints and constraints as well as an analysis of the capabilities needed, in order to develop potential military options balanced against those capabilities offered or potentially available.

The military options which are one of the most important parts of the military planning, encompass the full range of tasks defined in the TEU and the EUGS. Before proceeding any further, I would like to remind you the CSDP tasks (Art 43 TEU) which will be our Planning tasks and are depicted on the screen:

Military Planning is conducted at all four EU Levels as you may see on the screen:

Military Planning at the Political Strategic level comprises Advance and Crisis Response Planning.

Advance Planning (AP) is conducted to allow the EU to deal with potential crises. The products of Advance Planning can range from country books to possible actions suitable for dealing with specific crises. These products drafted in advance, inform and allow a smooth transition to the formal Crisis Response Planning for an identified crisis and significantly reduce the response time. It is further divided into two categories:

- Generic Planning is about potential Operations where some planning factors have not yet been fully identified or have not been assumed.

- Contingency Planning is the production of detailed planning documents for potential operations where the planning factors have been identified or assumed. They include indication of resources and deployment options.

As you understand AP is foresight for future difficult situations.

Crisis Response Planning is conducted to enable the EU to deal with emerging or existing crises and builds on Advance Planning products, whenever available. It starts as soon as a crisis is identified by the EU at the political strategic level. On the screen you may see the Standard EU Military Crisis Response Planning Process and its Phases.

No doubt, this is a very busy slide. We will elaborate and start from the Phases of Crisis Response Planning Process which are depicted on the screen:

I will deal only with the first two phases because these phases constitute the political strategic level. The next two belong to operational level and the last one is a periodic review of the whole mission.

Starting with the main product of the first Phase: The Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA).

You have examined the PFCA at your previous course.

As a bottom line, the PFCA is a document based on shared analysis, set the political context clearly articulating: what the crisis is, why the EU should act, and what instruments could be available and best suited for that action.

The drafting of PFCA is not taking place every time. The two last PFCAs were drafted in April 2015 on Libya and the Boko Haram insurgency.

This leads us to Phase 2: Development of CMC, MSO, IMD approval by the Council and establishment of the mission/operation.

Based on the PFCA, the PSC analyses the situation and considers that CSDP action may be appropriate. To this end, the PSC provides guidance as appropriate and tasks the EEAS to develop a Crisis Management Concept (CMC).

The CMC is the conceptual framework describing CSDP activity to address a particular crisis within the EU integrated approach. The CMC defines basically two things: the political strategic objectives for CSDP engagement and provides political strategic options to meet these EU objectives. The document is drafted by the Integrated Strategic Planning for CSDP and the Stabilization Branch of EEAS and describes the organization and resources required, remaining coherent with other EU lines of effort always in the spirit of Integrated Approach.

Based on the CMC, the EUMC may be tasked by the PSC to develop Military Strategic Options (MSO). This is a document drafted by EUMS and agreed by EUMC, which describes a military action designed to achieve the EU objectives as defined by the CMC. A MSO will outline a military course of action with the constraints and, in general terms the required resources. It should also include an assessment of feasibility and risk, an outline of the Command and Control structure and an indicative force capability. It will contain a mission statement, the objective, the desired End State, the Exit Strategy, the general objective of any military engagement and the degree to which military force will be employed, which are all derived from the CMC. Based on the EUMC recommendation, the PSC agrees the preferred MSO and identifies the Commander and the OHQ or the MPCC. Based on the PSC recommendation the Council adopts a Decision establishing the mission or operation. Here we are!!!! The operation or mission is launched!!! The fun is about to begin. We have the Commander, the HQ and what and how we will do it on the ground, in the crisis area.

After Council decision to establish the CSDP operation/mission and, the EUMC directs the EUMS to draft the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) for its approval. The IMD provides a clear description of the EU political-military objectives and the envisaged actions to achieve these objectives. In reality this Directive is a translation of the decisions and concepts from a political diplomatic safe language to clear specific and feasible actions and direct orders, avoiding doubts and second thoughts. It should comprise the strategic effects to be achieved and the actions to be taken. It should also include any direction, guidance, limitations and assumptions that Commanders should take into account during the development of the CONOPS, and how the CSDP ops or missions will be concluded. On EUMC approval, the IMD is issued to the Commander and planning authority for detailed military opera-

tional planning at the military strategic is eventually transferred. This is the moment Planning Authority is transferred to the Commander and its HQ. This release of the IMD by the EUMC to the Op Cdr or to the Dir MPCC marks not only the formal transfer of planning authority between the EUMS and the OHQ (or MPCC) but also marks the transition from the Political-Strategic Level to the Operational Level.

Now, I would like to say a few words on the existing Fast Track Process. The time required for the launch by the EU of the various operations varies from 5-22 weeks. I will not comment the sometimes strange, lengthy, and maybe reluctant way EU is reacting to crisis, but what are the main characteristics of a crisis?

- No or limited intelligence available
- No or limited time available to respond
- A very important value, person or asset of your own is gravely endangered

Based on these characteristics we can safely state that the EU usually is dealing with “other people” crises taking place usually thousands of miles away from Brussels. Maybe terrorism can be considered as an imminent crisis for the EU but even this is mainly national responsibility.

Nevertheless, under specific circumstances, the needed speed of reaction and the need to deploy a mission/operation at very short notice, may require rapid decision-making for a rapid response including rapid deployment. In this case, the ambition of the EU is to take the decision to launch an operation within a few days of the approval of the CMC. This ambition requires simplified procedures in order to launch the mission/operation. At the same time, the EU rapid response will require rapid access to financial resources and personnel as well as rapid national decision-making. The PSC will decide whether to utilise the fast-track process.

The minimal political decision-making steps before the launch of a mission/operation are the approval of the CMC, the IMD, the adoption of the Council Decision establishing the mission/operation and the approval of the OPLAN. In the the fast track the PFCA and the CONOPS are skipped and the MSOs are examined within the CMC, as you can see on the screen.

As a key take away from the military planning at Political Strategic level, I would propose you to take into account the importance of MSOs. Military Strategic Options are a key element of great importance – at the EU, as well as at the national level, - because they identify the real viable strategic options the military is presenting to its political masters for immediate and direct implementation.

I stop here and finally I am ready for your question on both parts.

European Security and Defence College

“CSDP AMT 2α Course 2022

“Security Challenges and Military Issues in the EU – Military Planning Concept at the Political and Strategic Level ”

Thessaloniki, 8 April 2022



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OUTLINE



- Threats – Challenges to the EU
- EU Global Strategy
- EU Security issues
- EU's Smart Power
- EUGS Projects
- EU Strategic Autonomy
- EU Strategic Compass
- EU Operations and Missions
- EU – NATO Relationship
- The birth of Geopolitical EU
- Supporting Ukraine
- Conclusions



OUTLINE

- ❑ Threats Challenges to the EU
- ❑ EU Global Strategy
- ❑ EU Security issues
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- ❑ EUGS Projects
- ❑ EU Strategic Autonomy
- ❑ EU Strategic Compass
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- ❑ EU – NATO Relationship
- ❑ The birth of Geopolitical EU
- ❑ Supporting UKR
- ❑ Conclusions

Revisionist Powers

dreaming of Long-Lost Imperial Past




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- ❑ Conclusions

RUSSIA

WITH ITS UNPROVOKED AND UNJUSTIFIED MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE, IS GROSSLY VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER AND UNDERMINING EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.



OUTLINE

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- ❑ The birth of Geopolitical EU
- ❑ Supporting UKR
- ❑ Conclusions

RUSSIA IS TRYING TO AMEND THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE



OUTLINE

- ❑ Threats Challenges to the EU
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**TWO OPTIONS ARE ALWAYS OFFERED BY TU:
CONCEDE OR FIGHT**

OUTLINE

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EU-CHINA RELATIONS

China is:

✓ **A partner** (i.e. on climate);

➤ **A competitor** (i.e. in economic terms); and

❖ **A rival** (i.e. in forms of governance and spheres of influence)



Military modernization will be competed by 2035



OUTLINE

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For the EU MS, national defence and security are national responsibilities.


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EU Global Strategy

- ✓ A reliable security provider
- ✓ New level of ambition

Three Strategic Priorities:



Response to crises



Support to partners




Protection of Europe

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EUGS concepts and projects related to security and stability



CARD: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation

EDF: European Defence Fund

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- **European Defence Fund (EDF): €7,014 Bn**
- **Military mobility, a project supporting NATO: €1,5 Bn**
- **European Peace Facility (EPF): €5 Bn which is a new, off-budget instrument to finance actions in the field of security and defence.**
- **In December 21, EU announced that with a budget of 900 M Euros, the “*Global Europe thematic programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention*” during the period of 2021-2027.**

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EU INTEGRATED APPROACH POLICY



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- Art. 42-7 of TEU: Mutual Assistance clause
- Art.222 of TFEU: Solidarity clause



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EU Strategic Autonomy

- Measures to **boost the EU's strategic sovereignty.**
- To “**avoid external dependencies** in a new geopolitical context”.
- Not autonomy *from* someone, but to do something **alone, if necessary.**

OUTLINE

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EU Strategic Autonomy

- It is now clear that EU Strategic Autonomy isn't about Europe separating from the US; but about Europe being able to act when the US or NATO are uninterested, unwilling, or incapable to do so

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- The Strategic Compass will upgrade EUGS without cancelling it.
- The EU realized that it should invest more in security and defence iob a stronger political and security actor.
- The EU understood suddenly that a wrong assessment was made regarding Russia, when good financial relations were considered as the basis for good geopolitical relations as well.

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- **With the Strategic Compass project, we set out a common strategic vision for EU security and defence Policy over the next 5-10 years and we will immediately start its implementation.**
- **This will help us build a common strategic culture, strengthen our unity and solidarity and, above all, enhance our capacity and willingness to act together, to protect our interests and defend our values.**
- **To that end, it identifies clear goals, the means to achieve them & specific timelines to measure progress.**

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- **The strength of our Union lies in unity, solidarity and determination.**
- **A stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of Collective Defence for its members.**
- **The Compass will also intensify support for the global rules-based order, with the United Nations at its core.**

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
“..The threats are rising and the cost of inaction is clear. The Strategic Compass is a guide for action. It sets out an ambitious way forward for our security and defence policy for the next decade. It will help us face our security responsibilities, in front of our citizens and the rest of the world. If not now, then when?..”

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The Strategic Compass

An ambitious plan of action strengthening EU by 2030



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ACT

In order to be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone, when necessary, the EU will:

- establish by 2025 a strong **EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops** for different types of crises.
- be ready to deploy by mid 2023, **200 fully equipped CSDP mission experts** within 30 days.
- conduct regular **live exercises (land and sea) from 2023.**
- enhance **military mobility starting the end of 2022.**
- reinforce the EU's **civilian and military CSDP msns and ops** by promoting a rapid and more flexible decision-making process, acting in a more robust way and ensuring greater financial solidarity.
- make full use of the **EPF** to support partners.

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SECURE

In order to strengthen its ability to anticipate, deter and respond to current and fast-emerging threats and challenges, and safeguard the EU's security interest, the EU will:

- boost its **intelligence** analysis capacities.
- develop **Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams** bringing together different instruments to detect and respond to a broad range of hybrid threats.
- further develop the **Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox and set up an EU Cyber Defence Policy** prepared for and respond to cyberattacks.
- develop a **Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox**.
- develop an **EU Space Strategy for Security & Defence**.
- strengthen the EU's role as a **maritime security actor**.

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INVEST

Member states have committed to **substantially enhance their defence expenditures** to match our collective ambition to reduce critical military and civilian capability gaps and **strengthen our EDTIB**. The EU will:

- exchange on national **objectives on increased and improved defence spending** to match our security needs.
- provide further incentives for member states to engage in collaborative capability development and jointly invest in **strategic enablers and next generation capabilities** to operate on land, at sea, in the air, in the cyber domain and in outer space.
- **boost defence technological innovation** to fill strategic gaps and **reduce technological and industrial dependencies**.

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PARTNER

In order to address common threats and challenges, the EU will:


- strengthen cooperation with strategic partners such as **NATO**, the **UN** and **regional partners**, including the OSCE, AU and ASEAN.
- develop more tailored **bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries** and strategic partners, such as the US, Canada, Norway, the UK, Japan and others.
- develop **tailored partnerships** in the Western Balkans, our eastern and southern neighborhood, Africa, Asia and Latin America, including through enhancing dialogue and cooperation, promoting **participation in CSDP missions and operations and supporting capacity- building.**

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EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS



EUFOR



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ALTHEA



EUFOR

ATALANTA



IRINI



EU Operations

- Contributing in SASE in BiH
- Anti-piracy ops in the Horn of Africa
- Protection of vulnerable shipping
- Implementation of the UN arms embargo off the coast of Libya

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ΣΥΝΤΟΝΙΣΜΕΝΗ ΘΑΛΑΣΣΙΑ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑ – COORDINATED MARITIME PRESENCE (CMP)

- Can be implemented in any maritime area of the world;
- Uses existing EU MS assets present or deployed on a voluntary basis;
- Relies on enhanced coordination of assets, which remain under national command;



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EU Training Missions



MALI



**CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC**



SOMALIA



MOZAMBIQUE

- Capacity Building
- Training to the local Armed Forces
- Advice to local military leaderships

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MILITARY PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY (MPCC)

DG EUMS & Director of MPCC



**Vice Admiral
H. Blejean, FRN**



- A double-hatted three-star Flag Officer
- Reports to PSC - Informs EUMC

By 2025 the MPCC will be able to plan and to conduct all non executive missions as well as two small scale or one medium scale operation as well as live exercises

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EU-NATO relations: *Mutual reinforcement *Burden sharing


Three levels of debate:

1. Relationship and complementarity;
2. What the EU member should be doing within NATO;
3. Broader Transatlantic bond.



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


In recent days we have witnessed the belated birth of geopolitical Europe.

The one we have been talking about for years: with a sense of purpose and using all means and leverage to support its political goals.

OUTLINE


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The EU acted extremely quickly and with unprecedented determination, breaking many taboos. Undoubtedly, we have gone further in a week than in decades of discussions.

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The EU has decided to use the EPF to provide € 450 M worth of lethal weapons equipment and € 50 M in non-lethal supplies. These measures will be fully consistent with what the EU MS have already decided to do on a national basis. This is the first time the EU has provided lethal military equipment. Additional 500 M € in military assistance are provided as well.

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Cyber Rapid Response Teams





«... We need to put more defence and security in our mentality and stop the theological debates about Strategic Autonomy. We can call it whatever we want but we have to take our security into our own hands. This war will also force us to increase our defence spending. We need to spend more but above all we need to spend better...»

HRVP Josep Borrell



“ ...This approach has nothing to do with weakening the transatlantic link, which, by the way is stronger than ever. To avoid being at the mercy of the others, EU needs to become a truly global actor. To enhance its power, Europe must strengthen its existing levers and look for new ones....”

HRVP Josep Borrell

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Conclusions

- ✓ Europe is our home and the EU is our family.
- ✓ We need commitment at the highest political level to make the EU a stronger security actor.
- ✓ My personal view: We deserve a stronger Europe.
- ✓ Let's make it happen!!!

“Security Challenges and Military Issues in the EU”



**End of the first part
of the Briefing**

Part II

“Military Planning at the Political, and Strategic Level”

General (Ret.) Mikhail Kostarakos

Former Chief of the HNDGS

Former Chairman of the EU Military Committee

CSDP Tasks

- **Joint Disarmament Operations**
- **Humanitarian and Rescue tasks**
- **Military advice and assistance tasks**
- **Conflict prevention and Peacekeeping tasks**
- **Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post conflict stabilization.**


Military Planning at EU Levels

- **Political Control & Strategic Direction in Brussels**
- **Military Strategic Level at OHQ/MPCC**
- **Operational Level at MHQ/FHQ**
- **Tactical Level (Component HQ/MHQ and below)**

Military Planning at Political Strategic level

- **Advance Planning**
 - Generic Planning**
 - Contingency Planning**
- **Crisis Response Planning**

EU Military Planning Process



Crisis Response Planning Process

□ The 5 Phases:

- **Phase 1: Identification of Crisis-Development of an overall Approach - PFCA**
- **Phase 2: Development of CMC,MSO,IMD**
- **Phase 3: Operational Planning – decision to launch**
- **Phase 4: Deployment / CONOPS/OPLAN**
- **Phase 5: Strategic Review / Termination**

➤ Phase 1: Identification of Crisis-Development of an overall Approach - PFCA



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MEMBER STATES / HR
(incl. Prudent/Advance
Planning)

Geo Desk


Prepares
(CION
Consultation)

Advice/
Comment


Note

PFCA = Political Framework for Crisis Approach = A conceptual framework describing the potential integrated approach of the EU to the management of a particular crisis.


➤ Phase 2: Development of CMC,MSO,IMD and establishment of the mission/operation



IMD Release – Transfer of Authority



Fast Track Planning Process



Military Strategic Options (MSOs)

- ✓ **MSO is a document which describes a military action designed to achieve the EU objectives as defined in the CMC. A MSO will outline a military course of action with the constraints and in general terms the required resources.**

MSOs are of great importance because they identify the real viable strategic options for immediate and direct implementation!

- ✓ **The EUMS/Crisis Planning Team is responsible to draft the document and will aim to develop up to three draft MSO, based on levels of ambition (must/should/could) in order to allow further consideration and selection by the EUMC and RSC.**

“Security Challenges and Military Issues in the EU”



Questions ?