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## **Orientation Course 2022**

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### **“Security Challenges and Military issues in the EU”.**

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**Larnaca, 26 May 2022**

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends,

Thank you very much for the invitation to participate in your Course. It's an honour and a privilege to participate in the mentoring team of the ESDC.

The Outline of my briefing is on the screen.

At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the global security situation deteriorated. International terrorism, growing waves of migration from Africa and Asia to Europe, climate change, and persistent human rights abuses combined with political unrest, civil war, and terrorism have begun to have a serious impact on the security situation in Europe. The COVID pandemic has worsened the situation. Existing threats have been amplified and new threats added to existing ones, hybrid and asymmetric by definition, including misinformation, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, hybrid threats and warfare including cyber-attacks.

There is a long list of geopolitical challenges to the EU, being the sum of the geopolitical challenges of the Member States:

The ongoing crises in Libya, Syria, the Caucasus, Belarus, Afghanistan and most recently Ukraine represent serious concerns for the EU. This should be combined with the demographic boom in Africa, along with the general failure of governance in many countries, political instability and racial or religious conflicts in Asia and Africa. This difficult situation is directly affected by cable television, social media, and mobile telephony, which "awakened young Africans and Asians citizens," and intensified the already existing waves of migration from the Middle East and North Africa.

But what is most worrying in the long run, is the revisionist policies of Russia, Turkey and to some extent China, which are aggressively seeking a new role to revive their long-lost imperial past. These revisionist policies, which ultimately aim to seek not only a new international geopolitical dominant role, but also a new vital or living space (Lebensraum), falsify history and exploit the weak points of Western Democracies, move in parallel and roughly on the same lines of a common narrative on the injustice of the world against their own people who are blocked in the way to their destiny. These revisionist approaches eventually led to the formulation of aggressive strategies, like the one we witness in Ukraine.

Russia is trying to amend the post-Cold War Security Architecture in Europe by reclaiming the Soviet sphere of influence they lost in 1990 when the Soviet Union collapsed. It is clear to all the Europeans now that NATO is not threatening Russia. NATO was created against the USSR, but this was concluded in 1990. At that time, we started considering Russia a strategic partner and a reliable ally against terrorism, until Mr. Putin due to developments in Ukraine again, decided to send his troops to invade and occupy Crimea. The attitude of the international community changed overnight because it was made clear, that Russia had turned into a revisionist force threatening to expand its territory and influence at the expense of those of its neighbors, whom Moscow considered less powerful. The possible threat of NATO expansion up to the Russian borders, a defensive Russian narrative that begun in 1995 became an easy excuse for Russia's expansion dreams and it was easy to be supported by the Russian propaganda mechanism.

I personally believe that the possibility of connection or accession of Ukraine to the EU not to NATO, concerns Mr Putin more than the proximity to NATO borders. Ukraine's immense resources and the unique potential of Ukrainian industrial and agricultural infrastructure with the support of the EU may turn Ukraine into a prosperous and rich country. However, a prosperous, democratic and a state of Law Ukraine, threatens Putin's regime far more than NATO's controversial missiles, and its authoritarian political power grip will be put in danger, following a possible and maybe inevitable awakening of its people. Unfortunately, Mr Putin found a lot of help due to a certain extend wrong readings of the situation by the EU and the US.

For the last decades the EU and its MS, together with a part of the previous American leadership believed that the solution for establishing good relationship with Russia was the further development of the financial and political relations through political contact, common interests and mutual benefits. They believed that the easy exchange of views or the free movement of goods and funds would further bring Russia closer to the EU and to the West in general persuading Mr. Putin to choose democracy, dialogue and

cooperation over threats, confrontation and conflict. To this end, Europe agreed to be dependent to Russian gas and to further invest in Russia. Obviously, this was a wrong reading of Russia. Good economy relations do not necessarily contribute to peace. Sometimes the opposite happens. Financing adventurism or revisionism is easier when based on a good and flourishing economy, as we have seen also in the past. All this was stopped to its biggest extent, following the Russian invasion to Crimea. So, miscalculating like Saddam Hussein that the West is a “paper tiger” he jumped into the Ukrainian swamp. And then everything changed. NATO became again the formidable military alliance and the EU a clearly nonmilitary international political and financial organization, for the first time in its history has financed with 2 bn Euros so far, the purchase and delivery to Ukraine of lethal weapons aid, which was the Original Sin until now for Brussels.

Russia's outrageous attack on Ukraine was a shock bringing back jungle brutality to the opening, but beside this, in recent weeks have witnessed a number of events and developments that were also waited for years to happen:

- NATO, having a clear military DNA in its genes, found again its proper self, and started planning and deploying capabilities at its Eastern borders, coordinating at the same time the provision of heavy and sophisticated weapons to Ukraine to defend itself.
- The belated birth of geopolitical Europe. The one we have been talking about for years: with a sense of purpose and using all means and leverage to support its political goals. The EU against all predictions, acted quickly and with unprecedented determination, breaking many taboos. Undoubtedly, we have gone further in a week than in decades of discussions. EU also agreed within a few hours to use the EPF to bring financial support and to coordinate the efforts of the MS to supply weapons to the Ukrainian Army to help the country defend itself against Russian aggression. Another taboo fell. We have and we plan retaliation capacities. We have mobilized these capacities and we have to continue doing so, by pooling the capacities of the MS and the EU institutions.
- The crisis bolstered transatlantic solidarity which were not at its best before the crisis although the election of Mr. Biden brought closer the US and the EU. A lot of things happened since.

It is necessary however to clarify some very important points from the beginning:

It should be more and more clear now to the EU establishment that no solutions to crisis can be reached without the proper use of the military tool and that makes the military not only one very important tool among the others in this unique and rich toolbox of the EU, but also a tool that has to be used when effective results are requested. This may sound as not enough in our tough world, but it is very important in the international rules-based order. Besides, we should not forget the two articles existing in the Treaties that could be invoked by a victim of aggression.

I refer to Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (solidarity clause), and to Article 42.7 of the Treaty of the European Union (mutual assistance clause). This course of action, given the situation in the area, deserves further consideration by the political leaderships of various MS, Cyprus and Greece included.

Turkey, the other revisionist force of the area is also a point of concern for the EU. The rising tensions and the confrontation of Turkey with Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea over the airspace, the territorial waters, the EEZ and lately the military status of the Greek islands I think are well known to the International Community. The options offered again by the Turks to their opponents are always the same that the Turks offer to all their opponents: Concede or Fight, but in this occasion, the capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces make the whole problem complicated and dangerous for the Turkish deep state establishment which supports and initiates this hardline stance. And they know it. On the other hand, one thing we should always keep in mind is that the borders under discussion are not exclusively Greek or Cypriot, but they are also EU borders. This is the main reason for the recent transformation of the Greek Turkish border and migration issues into EU Turkish issues, a development that made the Turks very unhappy.

Moving now back to 2016, when the EU launched the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). With the adoption of this Strategy, the EU launched an ambitious and substantial two-fold effort. First line of effort was to upgrade itself to a credible global geopolitical player, providing security and stability to the MS protecting their interests. Second line of effort was to define new strategic tasks representing its new practical level of ambition. In the EUGS, the main strategic tasks for the EU were described as follows: **(1)** Crisis Management, **(2)** Support to Partners and **(3)** Protection of Europe.

This protection of EU citizens mainly deals with health and law enforcement issues and therefore are matters for law enforcement agencies, police, border guards, gendarme-

rie, coast guard, etc. but certainly not military issues. And this should always be kept in mind when we discuss about the protection offered by the EU.

In order to achieve the objectives of this Strategy, a Policy known as the Integrated Approach Policy was developed and the EU, in order to implement it, relied on a large and unique set of policy tools, from the political to the diplomatic sector and from economic to military power.

All this leads us to three important conclusions in the field of security:

- First and foremost, for the EU MS, national defence and security are national responsibilities. The MS have to be able to defend their own territory and their sovereignty. In order to be able to do so, 21 of the EU MS participate in NATO, which takes responsibility of the Collective Defense of its members.
- Collective Defence of Europe therefore is a NATO responsibility. This has not changed and will not change in the foreseeable future.
- But for Greece and Cyprus NATO and EU roles have a completely different meaning: **(1)** Cyprus is not a NATO ally and therefore is not protected by NATO against any threat, **(2)** Greece is a NATO ally but in a confrontation with Turkey, NATO is not expected to take sides and subsequently Greece is not protected by the Alliance either; **(3)** EU remains the only “potential ally” for both countries.
- The Security Situation as a whole, is extremely complex and in our "ecosystem" the new threats and challenges cannot be addressed only through diplomatic means or by a country or organization alone, because none of our countries or our countries' coalitions or organizations have the strength or resources to deal with it all alone.

We all agree that the EU is not a military organization, and we should never even think to allow this to happen.

All of a sudden, EU MS realized that we need a quantum leap forward to develop a stronger and more capable EU that acts as a security provider, building upon the Union's fundamental values as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty on EU.

Moreover, the EU MS realized that besides the quantum leap the EU has to develop a stronger and more capable EU that acts as a security provider, building upon the Union's fundamental values as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty on EU. This is when the Strategic Compass project emerged, and this is what Strategic Compass is all about. The new document criticizes Russia for "showing readiness to use the highest level of military force, regardless of legal or humanitarian considerations, combined with hybrid tactics, cyber-attacks and manipulation and intervention of foreign intelligence, energy

coercion and offensive." The document also refers to "basic principles on which European security is built, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the founding documents of the OSCE, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. "These are the legal documents - which focus on the territorial integrity of states and borders, calling on states to refrain from the threat or use of force and clarifying the freedom of countries to choose or change their security arrangements, everything that has been challenged from Russia in the case of Ukraine.

With this, we set out a common strategic vision for EU's security and defence policy over the next 5-10 years, immediately starting its implementation giving the EU an ambitious plan of action for strengthening its security and defence policy by 2030. This Strategic Compass will also enhance the EU's Strategic Autonomy and its ability to work with partners to safeguard its values and interests. The Compass covers all the aspects of the security and defence policy and is structured around four pillars: **act, secure invest, partner**. The three most important points of the four pillars are:

- The establishment by 2025 a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops for different types of crises.
- The development of hybrid, rapid reaction teams to deal with difficult cyber-diplomatic situations as well as the handling of foreign information and all kinds of interventions and interference, as well as the creation of security, space, maritime and cyber defense policies to deal with a wide range. This is important because the EU is an interconnected community that if one member is threatened and affected, the whole EU as a whole will eventually be affected, allowing it to now develop dynamic "retaliation" policies against anyone who threatens its members, something unthinkable. so far.
- The commitment of MS to substantially enhance their defence expenditures to match our collective ambition to reduce critical capability gaps.
- To address common threats and challenges, the EU will strengthen cooperation with other strategic partners outside Europe.
- As much has been said about what the EU envisages in the Compass Strategy for Turkey, the EU remains committed to developing a mutually beneficial cooperation, but this requires an equal commitment on the part of Turkey to move forward on a path of co-operation, permanent de-escalation, and abstention. from new challenges or unilateral actions that violate international law. While in case of continuation of similar action, to use the means and options at its disposal to defend its interests and those of its Member States, as well as to maintain regional stability.

In terms of defense spending, the new draft of the Strategic Compass states that "it becomes urgent to spend more and in a better way" always in coordination between the MS and the EU. The EU is expected to "set targets for increased and improved defense

spending" by mid-2022, with the European Commission tasked with developing additional incentives for cooperative investment, such as the recent proposal to exempt MS from Value Added Tax (VAT) on the purchase of defense equipment produced in Europe, with the aim of promoting joint armaments projects.

When dealing with military issues in the EU, we must start with the highest military body in the EU, the Military Committee (Military Committee). The EUMC is composed of the Heads of General Staff and the 27 EU Member States who meet in person every six months or through their Military Representatives in Brussels on a weekly basis, or even more frequently, if required in order to guarantee that the voice and military advice of the end-users of the military capabilities of the MS, i.e. their General Staffs, are taken into account by the EU institutions and political authorities.

The Chairman of the Military Committee is automatically the highest military official in the EU, and is elected by secret ballot every three years by the 26 Chiefs of Defence (Danes do not vote). The Chairman is neither the Strategic Commander nor the head of the European Armed Forces, if they are ever created. The current Chairman is the former Austrian Chief of Defence, General Robert Brieger.

Now, based on the EUGS and its new ambitious geopolitical approach and considering that our neighborhood is increasingly dynamic, the EU has started working on a number of concepts and projects related to security and stability. These new projects deriving from EUGS are the following:

- First, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence known as CARD. This is a map of what military means the EU Member States have in their inventory or intend to procure, which are available for EU purposes as well as how much the MS are willing to spend on defence. CARD confirms that the European defence landscape is characterised by fragmentation and lack of coordination which is costing the EU MS approximately 100 bn Euros per year. This problem must be solved as soon as possible.
- The next cornerstone project is the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), an equally useful tool for cooperation, which imposed very strict commitments on the participating MS. The MS however, never fully complied with what they have signed for, no matter that they did so voluntarily. 60 PESCO projects are ongoing each one being at a different level of maturity.
- Military mobility: €1,5 billion – Military Mobility is the most important among PESCO projects. It is a strategic platform enabling the swift and seamless movement of military personnel and assets throughout the EU, whether by rail, road, air or sea. Although not openly admitted, this project is the cornerstone of EU-NATO cooperation, having a vast impact on NATO's capability to move through Europe.

- For the first time in EU's history, the EU Budget, aka MFF (Multiannual Financial Framework), 2021-27 features a section on defence and security. In a radical break from the past, EU leaders have agreed on the much-needed financial basis for further EU defence cooperation and now the agreed EU budget includes the following defence items:
  - European Defence Fund (EDF): €7,014 billion – The most crucial and most important defence and security initiative undertaken by the EU, a special EU budget dedicated to research, development, and acquisition of defence technology in order to strengthen the technological and industrial base of European defence.
  - European Peace Facility (EPF): €5 billion – A new, off-budget instrument to finance actions in the field of security and defence. This new instrument allows the EU for the first time to complement the activities of CSDP missions and operations in host countries with assistance measures, and to support partner military forces either by funding their operations or by supplying them with military equipment. All the funds to Ukraine almost 2 bn euros so far, are coming mainly from this Facility.

These projects although very important are not the only ones. The EU once more is stepping up its capacity to advance peace and security in conflicted-affected areas. In December 2021, it was announced that with a budget of almost 900 million Euros, the “Global Europe thematic programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention” will support actions with a global or trans-regional impact during the period of 2021-2027 by providing assistance to build capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness and addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats.

These projects give flesh to a new term recently coined, EU's Strategic Autonomy. The idea of this European strategic sovereignty is to *“avoid external dependencies in a new geopolitical context”*. With this we don't mean autonomy from any nation or international organization, but autonomy to do something alone, if necessary. In the meantime, while many may dispute the term ‘Strategic Autonomy’ (the US being the first among them) there is a growing realization that the EU must have a capacity to act without undue dependences in terms of capabilities, technologies, and political decision-making. To be more realistic and under the light of the tragic turn of events in Afghanistan, it is now clear that EU Strategic Autonomy isn't about Europe separating from the US; but about Europe being able to act when the US or NATO are uninterested, unwilling, or incapable to do so. And it is becoming increasingly easy to see scenarios in the Middle East or Africa where EU security and interests are in danger, but the US has little or no interest at all to act.

Turning now to the present situation. On the screen you can see where the EU is currently engaged, in three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia). I will not examine the

great job and the results or the outcome of the eleven civilian missions and FRONTEX, but I will restrict myself only to military missions. As military we are involved in three Executive Operations and four Non-Executive Missions.

The Operations include ALTHEA, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, contributing to a safe and secure environment, Operation ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, protecting vulnerable shipping from piracy at sea, and Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean, dealing with the implementation of the UN arms embargo at the high seas off the coast of Libya.

Last January, the EU Council launched the first pilot case of the new Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept in the Gulf of Guinea which is the area that accounts for 95% of maritime kidnappings in the world. France, Italy and Spain are already in the Gulf of Guinea providing naval and air support to support the pilot operation. In February 2022, the Council extended the operation in the Gulf of Guinea for a further two years until February 2024 and decided to launch a similar Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) operation in the North-West Indian Ocean Hormuz to the South Tropics and the North Red Sea to the centre of the Indian Ocean. The expansion of the CMP at the Indo-Pacific will be followed later by the East China Sea.

EU military training missions in Mali, the Central African Republic and Somalia, and most recently in Mozambique, provide training to the local armed forces and advice to their military leadership. Ongoing is the continuously review of EU training missions, which is likely to make them stronger, evolving from a key training role to an effective advisory as well as an accompanying role in combat missions. In this context and due to internal political developments, Russian intervention inside various countries but mainly after the execution of a military coup in Mali and the consequent rupture of France-Mali relations, the Educational Mission in Mali may be suspended in the near future or will be moved. Russia's presence with Wagner's ubiquitous mercenaries complicates France's relations, mainly as a former colonial power and consequently the EU with the local governments of the Sahel and the Central African Republic to the south. Developments may shift the focus of the counter-terrorism struggle and perhaps the headquarters of the Educational Mission from Mali to Niger. EUTM Mali's mandate expires in May 2024, which may need to be reconsidered in the light of the French withdrawal.

Increasing the level of ambition for these missions, the need was recognized and in 2017 a separate executive and administrative structure was created, known as the Military Planning and Conducting Capability Cell (MPCC), which is actually a Brussels-based Operations Headquarters within the EU Military Staff, which manages all the above non-executive

missions and is prevented from taking over the command of one or more operational missions in the future.

One of the most enigmatic issues facing the EU is its relations with China. China is both a partner, for example in terms of climate action, a competitor, especially in economic terms, and an adversary, with China actively promoting alternative forms of government and trying to expand its sphere of influence. China's growth and integration into the region, and the world at large, and its relationship with the United States, as well as with Russia and the EU, is expected to mark the rest of the century. We must ensure that this happens, at least as far as the EU is concerned, in a way that contributes to the overall defense of global security and does not run counter to the rule-based international order, but also to the EU's interests and our values. This requires strong unity between us and close cooperation with other regional and global partners in order to avoid and prevent miscalculations by the Ukrainian type from China to Taiwan that will significantly disrupt world peace and security.

This was the situation in the EU and its wider and narrower surroundings when the crisis broke out in Ukraine. As HRVP Borrell stated «With the invasion of Ukraine, we witness the return of war on European soil. We need to be more than a “soft power” and enhance our instruments to deter reckless adversaries.... To handle the wider impact of the war against Ukraine, we need to bolster European economic resilience, end our energy dependence on Russia and further strengthen European defence.».

Russia's outrageous attack on Ukraine was a shock, sending waves of fear, terror and unrest across the continent and into the global environment. Such an overt Policy and Use of Power threatens to create a world where the rule-based international order gives way to the laws of the jungle. We thought we had moved away from this jungle landscape of previous centuries and set out on a glade of understanding, respect and a civilized search for mutually beneficial solutions, but unfortunately Russia denied us.

As this is a full-scale war and Ukraine has every right to defend itself, we must support the country with the means needed for this self-defense. Moreover, given Russia's unique capabilities in the Hybrid War and the fact that cyber operations are vital, the work of the PESCO Cyber Rapid Response Teams was activated so that the European Commission could provide equipment, software and other formats and assistance to strengthen cyber resilience in Ukraine.

Before further examining the relation between the two organizations we need to make some paramount assumptions that should be the basis for further cooperation.

Turning now to the relationship between EU and NATO, the two organizations have to cooperate in order to promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The key words of EU-NATO relationship are mutual reinforcement and burden sharing. Although at the beginning in 2016 the magic word to ease tensions and characterize the relationship at the time was complementarity. It was not enough. So soon the new motto of the EU NATO relationship became: "Burden sharing" and "mutual reinforcement". Based on the following main security facts we may discuss a proposed "burden sharing".

So, the proposed "burden sharing", could be:

- The collective defence of Europe is clearly a NATO responsibility with the EU in a supporting role. NATO is the biggest military alliance in human history, a formidable force of unparalleled military might.
- The protection of Europe and its citizens is an EU strategic task. This is referring to border control, anti terrorist tasks, anti-crime, anti drug, anti human trafficking and an exclusive responsibility of law enforcement (nonmilitary) forces which are the main responders and operators.
- While NATO maintains the lead in collective defence against military threats, the EU must take the lead in building resilience against nonmilitary, mainly hybrid threats. Since the EU is a single market any act of subversion or coercion by a foreign actor against a Member State affects the Union as a whole and there diplomatic and economic actions are necessary, and NATO has limited instruments to react and should remain in supporting role, while measures from the US in these areas are not guaranteed.
- The EU and its member states should also assume the lead in expeditionary operations mainly towards the southern flank (MENA, MAHREB, SAHEL) supported by the vast strategic intelligence, various military capabilities and special forces of NATO.

In order to implement effectively this burden sharing and mutual reinforcement proper staff to staff contacts, coordination and maybe a common coordination group should be installed in order to align various Capability Plans, Planning Process, running projects and Reviews of both organizations.

This is a critical moment for the EU. It is also time for the European Union to discuss and decide what it wants to be. To meet the challenges of the future, it must review many things such as the way of thinking, the processes, the methods, paying more attention to its ability to act instead of endless internal discussions. The current tragic moment of the Ukrainian crisis must push EU to take this path further in order to protect

lives, and to ensure the safety and well-being of all. This is the real challenge that must be faced in the immediate future.

To quote High Representative/Vice President of the Commission Josep Borrell: «We need to put more defence and security in our mentality and stop the theological debates about strategic autonomy. To avoid being at the mercy of the others, needs to become a truly global actor. We need to put more defence and security in our mentality and stop the theological debates about Strategic Autonomy. To avoid being at the mercy of the others, needs to become a truly global actor. To enhance its power, Europe must strengthen its existing levers and look for new ones.... We can call it whatever we want but we have to take our security into our own hands. This war will also force us to increase our defence spending.

We need to spend more but above all we need to spend better... To enhance its power, Europe must strengthen its existing levers and look for new ones.... The Strategic Compass will provide a framework for using these additional military means in an efficient and coordinated way within the EU, ensuring full complementarity with NATO. With the European Defence Agency we will also analyze the structure of our military spending and the investment gaps and propose additional initiatives to strengthen the European defence industrial and technological base.».

This is where we stand in the Ukrainian crisis: Closing our ranks we will face with remarkable solidarity and determination the inhuman brutal invasion executed by Russia, until the war is over and peace and stability is restored in the area. To handle the wider impact of the war against Ukraine, we need to bolster European economic resilience, end our energy dependence on Russia, and further strengthen European Defence.».

And then what next? This solidarity has to be preserved if we want to maintain our values based international order and avoid unnecessary friction and confrontation that will destroy the necessary for the survival of the West transatlantic link.

After the end of the war, Ukraine and neighboring countries, as well as migration problems and damaged Ukrainian infrastructure and related social problems, will require a large amount of capital and investment (estimated between 200-500 billion euros), i.e. a new Marshall Plan for Ukraine and the region, if of course we really want to make a successful and efficient return to Ukraine and the adjacent region. And there is no better partner of the USA and the UN for the success of this goal by the world's largest humanitarian and development provider, the Queen of Smart Power, the EU.

So, what will be the situation and the relationship among the main international players following the Ukrainian crisis. Starting with Russia.

- Russia will remain one of the great powers of the world. But it is also expected to continue to slip behind the US, China and the EU in terms of political influence and economic prosperity. But Russia is now out of the world order. However, it will continue to have and seek to expand and strengthen its role. The world may experience a "mini-cold war" between the West and Russia, while EU-US relations with China and Sino-Russian relations will continue and perhaps strengthen. The West's geo-economic attack on Russia has impressed the whole world, including China, which will avoid finding itself in a similar position.

Its military power allows Russia to pursue a dynamic policy beyond its own really limited political and economic weight, and the exercise of its disruptive power will continue to be relatively easy. Is it difficult to assess now whether its proven limited capabilities will push Moscow to explore a more cooperative, rather than a major, strategy of conflict? Or will it continue to try to capitalize on its power with assertiveness and aggression? As they found in Ukraine, choices, especially those based on a lack of analysis and limited contact with reality, always come at a price.

The big challenge is the future of the EU's relationship with Russia itself. If the war still ends in peace through negotiations, then the EU and Russia can gradually create a tense framework of coexistence, in which the EU will lift some of its sanctions or start some trade relations, taking care not to repeat the addictive mistakes of the past. However, Europe will now permanently import the natural resources it requires elsewhere. If, however, the war ends in a military stalemate without any peace agreement, then the EU must also maintain all sanctions and prepare for a permanent danger of a new escalation and tensions across their common borders if such a thing exists for the EU.

- For the EU, the pursuit of harassing policies by anyone, especially by the Russians or the Chinese, the EU must begin to think about how to deal with and possibly reciprocate possible "hybrid" actions against such actions that will be manifested mainly by the Russians. Whatever path Putin takes, however, the EU must always remain open to dialogue, with the motto: Work together when you can, but reciprocate when needed. This will require the EU and the Member States to develop a much stronger European reflex, however. If Europe's strategic decision-making center is empty, indifferent, divided, or weak, then neither cooperation nor repulsion will be properly implemented, and the EU will be constantly shaken by the next dynamic move that will come as a surprise from any world power. And we do not deserve that. We need a stronger, more aware and more autonomous Europe in all areas to ensure security and stability.

In closing, I believe that:

- For the EU, the conclusion should be always the same: foreign policy and defense integration is necessary and urgent, as is further strengthening of its economic power, so that in any scenario the EU can support a peaceful world order with a clear goal: the support of a world, with a set of generally accepted rules that will uphold and enforce peace, security and prosperity, to which all states will subscribe. In the meantime, the Union for its part, must remain firmly focused on its vital interests: safeguarding its own way of life, preventing any diffusion of insecurity from either the east or the south that could threaten it.

Thank you.

Dear friends, we deserve a stronger Europe. Let's make it happen!

I stop here and I am ready for your questions.

# European Security and Defence College

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## “CSDP Orientation Course 2022”

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### “Security Challenges and Military Issues in the EU”

**Larnaca, 26 May 2022**



**General (ret.) Mikhail Kostarakos**

**Former Chief of HNDGS - Former Chairman of EUMC**


# OUTLINE



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- EU Global Strategy
- EU security issues
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## RUSSIA IS TRYING TO AMEND THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE



- ❑ Security Challenges
- ❑ RU- TU- CHI rev. policies
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# RUSSIA IS TRYING TO AMEND THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE



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Following the crisis, we witnessed a number of events and Developments that were awaited for years to happen:

- NATO, having a clear military DNA in its genes, found again its proper self, and started planning and deploying capabilities at its Eastern borders, coordinating at the same time the provision of heavy and sophisticated weapons to Ukraine to defend itself.
- The belated birth of geopolitical Europe. The one we have been talking about for years: Undoubtedly, we have gone further in a week than in decades of discussions. EU also agreed within a few hours to use the EPF.
- The crisis bolstered transatlantic solidarity which were not at its best before the crisis although the election of Mr Biden brought closer the US and the EU.


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- Art. 42-7 of TEU: Mutual Assistance clause
- Art.222 of TFEU: Solidarity clause




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**Two options are always offered by Turkey:  
Concede or Fight**

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## EU Global Strategy

- ✓ A reliable security provider
- ✓ New level of ambition

### Three Strategic Priorities:

**Crisis Management**

**Support to Partners**

**EU Protection**



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## EU INTEGRATED APPROACH POLICY



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**For the EU MS, national defence and security are national responsibilities.**

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➤ The Security Situation as a whole is extremely complex, and the new threats and challenges cannot be addressed only through diplomatic means or by a country or organization alone, because none of us has the strength or resources to deal with it all alone.

➤ We all agree that the EU is not a military organization, and we should never even think to allow this to happen.

➤ All of a sudden, EU MS realized that we need a quantum leap forward to develop a stronger and more capable EU that acts as a security provider, building upon the Union's fundamental values as laid down in Article 2 of the TEU.

➤ Moreover, the EU MS realized that besides the quantum leap the EU has to develop a stronger and more capable EU that acts as a security provider, building upon the Union's fundamental values as laid down in Article 2 of the TEU.

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➤ This is when the Strategic Compass project emerged and this is what Strategic Compass is all about. The new document criticizes Russia for "showing readiness to use the highest level of military force, regardless of legal or humanitarian considerations, combined with hybrid tactics, cyber-attacks and manipulation and intervention of foreign intelligence, energy coercion and offensive."

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- **The strength of our Union lies in unity, solidarity and determination.**
- **A stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of Collective Defence for its members.**
- **The Compass will also intensify support for the global rules-based order, with the United Nations at its core.**

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- **With the Strategic Compass project, we set out a common strategic vision for EU security and defence Policy over the next 5-10 years and we will immediately start its implementation. An ambitious plan of action for security and defence policy by 2030**
- **This will help us build a common strategic culture, strengthen our unity and solidarity and, above all, enhance our capacity and willingness to act together, to protect our interests and defend our values.**
- **To that end, it identifies clear goals, the means to achieve them & specific timelines to measure progress.**

# The Strategic Compass

An ambitious plan of action strengthening EU by 2030



**Act**

**Secure**

**Invest**

**Partner**

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## ACT

In order to be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone, when necessary, the EU will:

- establish by 2025 a strong **EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops** for different types of crises.
- be ready to deploy by mid 2023, **200 fully equipped CSDP mission experts** within 30 days.
- conduct regular **live exercises (land and sea) from 2023.**
- enhance **military mobility starting the end of 2022.**
- reinforce the EU's **civilian and military CSDP msns and ops** by promoting a rapid and more flexible decision-making process, acting in a more robust way and ensuring greater financial solidarity.
- make full use of the **EPF** to support partners.

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## SECURE

In order to strengthen its ability to anticipate, deter and respond to current and fast-emerging threats and challenges, and safeguard the EU's security interest, the EU will:

- boost its **intelligence** analysis capacities.
- develop **Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams** bringing together different instruments to detect and respond to a broad range of hybrid threats.
- further develop the **Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox and set up an EU Cyber Defence Policy** prepared for and respond to cyberattacks.
- develop a **Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference** Toolbox.
- develop an **EU Space Strategy for Security & Defence**.
- strengthen the EU's role as a **maritime security actor**.

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## INVEST

Member states have committed to **substantially enhance their defence expenditures** to match our collective ambition to reduce critical military and civilian capability gaps and **strengthen our EDTIB**. The EU will:

- exchange on national **objectives on increased and improved defence spending** to match our security needs.
- provide further incentives for member states to engage in collaborative capability development and jointly invest in **strategic enablers** and **next generation capabilities** to operate on land, at sea, in the air, in the cyber domain and in outer space.
- **boost defence technological innovation** to fill strategic gaps and **reduce technological and industrial dependencies**.

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### **PARTNER-1**

In order to address common threats and challenges, the EU will:

- strengthen cooperation with strategic partners such as **NATO**, the **UN** and **regional partners**, including the OSCE, AU and ASEAN.
- develop more tailored **bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries** and strategic partners, such as the US, Canada, Norway, the UK, Japan and others.
- develop **tailored partnerships** in the Western Balkans, our eastern and southern neighborhood, Africa, Asia and Latin America, including through enhancing dialogue and cooperation, promoting **participation in CSDP missions and operations and supporting capacity- building.**

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## **PARTNER-2**

•As much has been said about what the EU envisages in the Compass Strategy for Turkey, the EU remains committed to developing a mutually beneficial cooperation, but this requires an equal commitment on the part of Turkey to move forward on a path of co-operation, permanent de-escalation and abstention. From new challenges or unilateral actions that violate international law. While in case of continuation of similar action, to use the means and options at its disposal to defend its interests and those of its Member States, as well as to maintain regional stability.



**In terms of defense spending, the new draft of the Strategic Compass states that "it becomes urgent to spend more and in a better way" always in coordination between the MS and the EU. The EU is expected to "set targets for increased and improved defense spending" by mid-2022, with the European Commission tasked with developing additional incentives for cooperative investment, such as the recent proposal to exempt MS from Value Added Tax (VAT) on the purchase of defense equipment produced in Europe, with the aim of promoting joint armaments projects.**

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# EU Military Committee



**Former AT Chief of Defence  
General Robert Brieger**



## The European Union Military Committee

- Highest military body in EU (27 CHODs)
- Directs all EU military activities
- Provides military advice and Recommendations to the PSC and HR/VP



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## Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)

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- A map of EU Member States' **military means** for EU purposes
- **Lack of coordination** on European defence which costs **~100 bn Euros per year**
- 55 collaborative opportunities in capability development; 56 opportunities for R&T cooperation



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## Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

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- Supports **joint development; acquisition and deployment** of defence capabilities
- **25/27 MS** participate; **60 PESCO projects approved**
- **Military mobility (1.5 Bn €)** is a strategic platform enabling seamless military movement throughout EU



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## Financial basis for further EU defence cooperation

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- **European Defence Fund (EDF): 7.014 Bn €**
  - Special budget for R&D
- **Military Mobility: 1.5 Bn €**
- **European Peace Facility (EPF): 5 Bn €**
  - Instrument to finance actions in the field of security and defence



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## **European Peace Facility (EPF – 5 Bn euros) already decided Assistance Measures (in million euros):**

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A new, off-budget instrument to finance actions in the field of security and defence.

This new instrument allows the EU for the first time to complement the activities of CSDP missions and operations in host countries with assistance measures, and to support partner military forces either by funding their operations or by supplying them with military equipment.


**All the funds to Ukraine almost 2 bn euros so far, are coming mainly from this Facility.**

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## “Global Europe” thematic programme on Peace, Stability & Conflict Prevention: 900 Bn €

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- The 900 million euros programme will support actions with a **global or trans-regional impact** during the period of 2021-2027 by providing assistance to **build capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness and addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats**



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


## EU Strategic Autonomy

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- Measures to **boost the EU's strategic sovereignty.**
- To “**avoid external dependencies** in a new geopolitical context”.
- Not autonomy *from* someone, but to do something **alone, if necessary.**

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## EU Strategic Autonomy


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- **It is now clear that EU Strategic Autonomy isn't about Europe separating from the US; but about Europe being able to act when the US or NATO are uninterested, unwilling, or incapable to do so**

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## EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS



# EU Operations

**ALTHEA**



**EUFOR**

**ATALANTA**



**IRINI**



➤ Contributing in SASE in BiH

➤ Anti-piracy ops in the Horn of Africa

➤ Protection of vulnerable shipping

➤ Implementation of the UN arms embargo off the coast of Libya

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
## Some Security Conclusions.

- ✓ It is necessary to use all available means. None of our countries or organizations have the strength or the resources to deal with it all alone.
- ✓ The strengthening of the EU's role as an international organization and a geopolitical player is of paramount importance.
- ✓ The EU is not a military organization. The EU however should dispose some kind of Hard power in order to play a serious geopolitical role.
- ✓ No solutions can be reached without the proper use of the military tool and that makes the military a very important tool and also a tool that has to be used when effective results are requested.

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## ΣΥΝΤΟΝΙΣΜΕΝΗ ΘΑΛΑΣΣΙΑ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑ – COORDINATED MARITIME PRESENCE (CMP)

- Can be implemented in any maritime area of the world;
- Uses existing EU MS assets present or deployed on a voluntary basis;
- Relies on enhanced coordination of assets, which remain under national command;



# EU Training Missions



**MALI**



**CENTRAL  
AFRICAN  
REPUBLIC**



**SOMALIA**



**MOZAMBIQUE**

- Capacity Building
- Training to the local Armed Forces
- Advice to local military leaderships

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# MILITARY PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY (MPCC)

**DG EUMS & Director of MPCC**



**Vice Admiral  
H. Blejean, FRN**



- A double-hatted three-star Flag Officer
- Reports to PSC - Informs EUMC

**By 2025 the MPCC will be able to plan and to conduct all non executive missions as well as two small scale or one medium scale operation as well as live exercises**

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# EU-CHINA RELATIONS

**China is:**

- ✓ **A partner** (i.e. on climate);
- **A competitor** (i.e. in economic terms); and
- ❖ **A rival** (i.e. in forms of governance and spheres of influence)



**Military modernization will be competed by 2035**



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# OUTLINE

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- ❑ EU-NATO Credits
- ❑ EU-TU security issues
- ❑ EU Global Strategy
- ❑ EU Military tool
- ❑ EU's Smart Power
- ❑ EUMC-EUGS Projects
- ❑ Strategic Autonomy & Compass
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**«With the invasion of Ukraine, we witness the return of war on European soil. We need to be more than a “soft power” and enhance our instruments to deter reckless adversaries.»**

**HRVP J. Borrell**



# Cyber Rapid Response Teams



Security Challenges

RU- TU- CHI rev. policies

EU – Russia policies

TU revisionist pol.

EU Global Strategy

EU security issues

Strategic Compass

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## EU-NATO relations: \*Mutual reinforcement \*Burden sharing

Keeping in mind that the strength of our Union As well as the security of the West lies in unity, solidarity and determination, we turn to the relationship between EU and NATO. The two organizations have to cooperate in order to promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.



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## EU-NATO relations: \*Mutual reinforcement \*Burden sharing

Keeping in mind that the strength of our Union As well as the security of the West lies in unity, solidarity and determination, we turn to the relationship between EU and NATO. The two organizations have to cooperate in order to promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The key words are: **Mutual reinforcement and Burden sharing.**



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## EU-NATO proposed Burden sharing

The collective defence of Europe is clearly a NATO responsibility with the EU in a supporting role. NATO is the biggest military alliance in human history, a formidable force of unparalleled military might.

The protection of Europe and its citizens is an EU strategic task. This is referring to border control, anti terrorist tasks, anti-crime, anti drug, anti human trafficking and is an exclusive responsibility of law enforcement (nonmilitary) forces which are the main responders and operators.



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## EU-NATO proposed Burden sharing

While NATO maintains the lead in collective defence against military threats, the EU must take the lead in building resilience against nonmilitary, mainly hybrid threats. Since the EU is a single market any act of subversion or coercion by a foreign actor against a Member affects the Union as a whole and there diplomatic and economic actions are necessary, and NATO has limited instruments to react and should remain in supporting role, while measures from the US in these areas are not guaranteed.



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## EU-NATO proposed Burden sharing

The EU and its member states should also assume the lead in expeditionary operations mainly towards the southern flank (MENA, MAHREB, SAHEL) supported by the vast strategic intelligence, various military capabilities and special forces of NATO.



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## EU-NATO proposed Burden sharing

In order to implement effectively this burden sharing and mutual reinforcement proper staff to staff contacts, coordination and maybe a common coordination group should be installed in order to align various Capability Plans, Planning Process, running projects and Reviews of both organizations.





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**«To handle the wider impact of the war against Ukraine, we need to bolster European economic resilience, end our energy dependence on Russia, and further strengthen European Defence.»**

**HRVP J. Borrell**



**«... We need to put more defence and security in our mentality and stop the theological debates about Strategic Autonomy. To avoid being at the mercy of the others, needs to become a truly global actor. To enhance its power, Europe must strengthen its existing levers and look for new ones.... We can call it whatever we want but we have to take our security into our own hands.**

**This war will also force us to increase our defence spending.  
We need to spend more but above all we need to spend better...»**

**HRVP Josep Borrell**



**The Strategic compass will provide a framework for using these additional military means in an efficient and coordinated way within the EU, ensuring full complementarity with NATO.**

**With the EDA we will also analyze the structure of our military spending and the investment gaps, and propose additional initiatives to strengthen the European defence industrial and technological base.**

**HRVP J. Borrell**



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. After the end of the war, Ukraine and neighboring countries, as well as migration problems and damaged Ukrainian infrastructure and related social problems, will require a large amount of capital and investment (estimated between 200-500 billion euros), which is a new Marshall Plan for Ukraine and the region, if of course we really want to make a successful and efficient return to Ukraine and the adjacent region.

## What will be the situation and the relationship among the main international players following the Ukrainian crisis.

✓ Russia will remain one of the great powers of the world. But it is also expected to continue to slip behind the US, China and the EU in terms of political influence and economic prosperity.



✓ Its military power allows Russia to pursue a dynamic policy beyond its own really limited political and economic weight, and the exercise of its disruptive power will continue to be relatively easy. Is it difficult to assess now whether its proven limited capabilities will push Moscow to explore a more cooperative, rather than a major, strategy of conflict?

## What will be the situation and the relationship among the main international players following the Ukrainian crisis.



- ✓ The big challenge is the future of the EU's relationship with Russia itself. If the war still ends in peace through negotiations, then the EU and Russia can gradually create a tense framework of coexistence, in which the EU will lift some of its sanctions or start some trade relations, taking care not to repeat the addictive mistakes of the past.

## What will be the situation and the relationship among the main international players following the Ukrainian crisis.



- ✓ If, however, the war ends in a military stalemate without any peace agreement, then the EU must also maintain all sanctions and prepare for a permanent danger of a new escalation and tensions across their common borders if such a thing exists for the EU.



**For the EU, the pursuit of harassing policies by anyone, especially by the Russians or the Chinese, the EU must begin to think about how to deal with and possibly reciprocate possible "hybrid" actions against such actions that will be manifested mainly by the Russians. Whatever path Putin takes, however, the EU must always remain open to dialogue, with the motto: Work together when you can, but reciprocate when needed. This will require the EU and the Member States to develop a much stronger European reflex, however. If Europe's strategic decision-making center is empty, indifferent, divided, or weak, then neither cooperation nor repulsion will be properly implemented, and the EU will be constantly shaken by the next dynamic move that will come as a surprise from any world power.**



Whatever path Putin takes, however, the EU must always remain open to dialogue, with the motto: **Work together when you can, but reciprocate when needed.** This will require the EU and the Member States to develop a much stronger European reflex, however. If Europe's strategic decision-making center is empty, indifferent, divided, or weak, then neither cooperation nor repulsion will be properly implemented, and the EU will be constantly shaken by the next dynamic move that will come as a surprise from any world power. And we do not deserve that. We need a stronger, more aware and more autonomous Europe in all areas to ensure security and stability.

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## Conclusions

➤ **For the EU, foreign policy and defense integration are necessary and urgent, as is further strengthening of its economic power, so that in any scenario the EU can support a peaceful world order with a clear goal: the support of a world, with a set of generally accepted rules that will uphold and enforce peace, security and prosperity, to which all states will subscribe.**

➤ **the Union for its part, must remain firmly focused on its vital interests: safeguarding its own way of life, preventing any diffusion of insecurity from either the east or the south that could threaten it.<sup>111</sup>**

# “Security Challenges and Military Issues in the EU”



Questions?