General (ret.) Mikhail Kostarakos
Former Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff
Former Chairman of the European Union Military Committee

Hybrid Workshop

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"NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception"

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Athens, 8 February 2022

Ladies and Gentlemen

Distinguished speakers, dear friends, good morning,

Let me start by thanking the organisers for their kind invitation to participate in this, high level Conference on a so interesting topic. The title of this presentation captures the perception of two important international organizations on this new form of warfare. New form or it is only the name that changed?

The term "hybrid force" was used for the first time in 1998 by US Navy (USN) Lieutenant Robert G. Walker in his thesis at the US Naval Post Graduate School, on "US Marine Corps (USMC) Special Operations". The term was attributed to the USMC that historically has demonstrated itself as a "hybrid force" capable of conducting operations within both the conventional and unconventional realms of warfare.

Avoiding mentioning Hybrid examples from pre-20th century history, the two World Wars of 20th century with the tenths of millions of casualties and the estimated total destruction and hundreds of millions of deaths in case of a possible future thermonuclear war, reminded to the decision makers and politico-military scholars that another way should be followed in order to impose our own will to the adversaries.

In the meantime, the Soviet Union understood that they had at their disposal a nonconventional spiritual weapon of equal power with reli-

gion: the ideology of Communism. And they started using it, the same way, various religions were used by others in the previous centuries.

Ideology, political maneuvers, exploitation of personal vulnerabilities, subversion, guerilla groups and tactics, unconventional warfare, press influence and fake news, undermining and criminal activity became the new weapons of choice in this different type of warfare. This period known as Cold War, saw little combat action and little blood by the Great Powers, but a lot of bloody Proxy wars, as well as intense political, diplomatic, economic and ideological activities and skirmishes, that could achieve the same results as the bloody wars of the past.

When the Soviet system collapsed, new ideologies and concepts started filling the gap: globalization and liberal order together with Islamic extremism and terror. A new charter for the combined forms of war fight has started and this time it was called Hybrid and it was immediately adopted by everyone.

Another USMC military theorist, LtCol (retired) Frank Hoffman significantly contributed to the popularization of the term, like a modern apostle of Hybrid Warfare who used this term for the first time to describe Hezbollah tactics and strategies as seen in the summer 2006 battle between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah clearly demonstrated the ability of non-state actors to study and exploit the weak points and vulnerabilities of Western style militaries, even of one of the best among them, like the Israeli Armed Forces and to devise appropriate counter measures with surprising effective results. The term gained immense popularity and further proliferated and mainstreamed from 2008 onwards, largely due to its adoption by NATO's Allied Command Transformation and the interconnected nature of military and policy makers within NATO.

In effect, Hybrid Wars blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatism, the ruthlessness and the protracted fervor of irregular warfare. It seems that there are no limits at the Hybrid landscape.

We conclude that in general terms Hybrid Threats are characterized by:

- A capacity to identify and the ability to exploit the vulnerabilities and the weak points of the targets across the political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure (PMESII) spectrum, in ways that were not previously considered.
- A combination of conventional and unconventional, military and non –military, overt and covert actions.
- A wider set of military, political, economic and civil, information (MPECI) tools and techniques that cannot usually be found at traditional threat assessments.
- An effort of creating confusion and ambiguity on the origin, the nature and the aim of the threat.
- A difficulty to be identified as Hybrid until it is well underway, with damaging effects having already begun manifesting themselves and degrading a target's capability to defend itself.
- A synchronization of means in novel ways.
- A capacity of keeping the level of hostility below any threshold of conventional war or armed aggression and therefore to stay out of any UN Chart and International Laws and Conventions on War and Conflicts provisions and jurisdiction.

On the other hand, Hybrid Threats are not:

- Defined by their actors or origin, since states, non-states actors and even individuals might be considered as such.
- Related to some specific technology, because this list keeps growing, as new technologies become available.
- Aiming to specific effects, as a hybrid campaign may result in different outcomes, such as human casualties, decision changing, government swap, social or economic destruction, altered public perception etc.

All in all, perhaps the best way to put it, is that "Hybrid Threat" could be a clear manifestation of a Total War but out of any classical definition of war, and below all armed aggression or conflict thresholds and International Law provision and jurisdiction.

Based on all these considerations we may proceed to an initial definition of "the Hybrid Opponent" profile:

“The Hybrid Opponent, seeking to exploit the full range of target’s weaknesses, possesses the capacity and the initiative of simultaneous escalation at different points, along a broadly defined spectrum of conflict, moving beyond the limits of any battlefield at will, in order to target state or society. At the same time, he may use different channels and proxies for unlawful actions, often making not only attribution difficult but also identification of clear strategic objectives almost impossible.”

Who specifically these opponents may be, is depicted on the screen.

Concluding the historical and definition’s part, a new question emerges: To whom these labels of Hybrid Threats and Opponents are ascribed, within the contemporary geopolitical framework? If Hybrid Warfare characteristics, as some scholars argue, “were deduced from looking at the enemy”, then who the enemy is and what we should do to face it?

In Western perceptions, Russia is the embodiment of an actor conducting Hybrid Warfare. Events in Georgia, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have led US, NATO and EU security officials to pay greater attention to Russia’s assertive behavior and its ways of war. Russia’s Soviet past pays its toll as well.

Numerous intelligence sources describe President Putin’s preferred method as “Hybrid Warfare”, a blend of hard and soft power. Indeed, according to a statement by Putin in 2006, Russia’s approaches to conflict “are to be based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetrical, and less costly.”

Moreover, the statements of the Russian Chief of General Staff General Gerasimov made some Western experts to believe that the West must adjust to the situation in which it now finds itself in relation to Russia to a “permanent Hybrid War” where “…Russia has witnessed a tendency towards blurring the lines between war and peace ... while ... the role of non-military means in achieving political and strategic goals in many cases, exceeded the power of force of weapons....”

Russia, however, is not the only perceived Hybrid Threat by the West. In the current European security environment, the other major Hybrid Threat is perceived to be the Al Qaida Islamic Organization and the Is-

lamic State (IS) known also as ISIS or DAESH as well as various sister-organizations of Islamic extremism and/or terrorism in Middle East, Africa and Asia. ISIS has shown a high level of expertise, knowledge, and professionalism on hybrid issues, exploiting very fast, effectively and successfully all Hybrid tools it had at its disposal. They created, managed and spread-out terror in such a way that made the multi-billion dollars New Iraqi Army to collapse without big battles, within weeks.

But this is not exclusively a European or Middle East issue. China remains a very old player who recently remerged at the global scene. One should not forget that the Sun Tzu writings about winning wars without giving battles were the real incentive and leverage of this form of warfare. Chinese hybrid operations conducted against and inside neighboring countries, suggest that Beijing's doctrine is much more than merely academic.

China's conception of "Quasi-War", (a term referring to an undeclared, although fiercely conducted, mostly naval form of warfare) which is part of their Conception of Military Operations (Wartime - Quasi War - Non-Wartime), widely known as "Three War Concept", clearly embraces legal, psychological and information activities short of war, while at the same time builds up national power, increases conventional military capabilities and extends its military reach. Remains to be seen to what extend China will retain an interest in Hybrid Warfare when it obtains global parity or superiority.

Another fresh and very skilful Hybrid player emerged the last years: Turkey. President Erdoγan of Turkey, as part of his effort to upgrade not only Turkey to a powerful Regional Power but also himself to a prominent and dominant figure in Turkish history, proceeded to instrumentalize and later weaponize the basic and dominant Hybrid "tools" (or "weapons") which, Turkey has in its Hybrid toolbox. These tools (or weapons) are known for Turkey as the "three Ms": Migrants, Military and Mosques. Although they can be used independently, they are usually used in combination, with one complemented by the others.

Against Greece, the military threats, the threatening casus belli statements, the military power projection and the aggressive policy, com-

bined with the constant violations of national sovereignty (Hybrid tools by definition) have been combined with the uncontrolled sending of refugees and immigrants violating Greek and EU borders. This is a Hybrid invasion which is designed to create problems in both Greece and the EU, forcing Athens and Brussels to succumb to Turkish geopolitical and economic demands. Above all, this Hybrid invasion has the potential to create a huge social, economic and security problem in Greece, in EU and at all the adjacent bordering countries. The Hybrid nature of this migration "invasion" against EU at its borders should be therefore considered as Hybrid because it is carried out not by armed soldiers but by unarmed civilians.

Turning now to find what the West and its two main international organizations are doing to protect themselves from Hybrid Threats.

At the beginning, Hybrid Warfare became the buzzword of choice for NATO and later for the EU. Unsurprisingly there was no common understanding of the term among NATO Allies and EU Member States. There was a follow-on to the saying that hybrid warfare "was deduced from looking at the enemy", adding that hybrid warfare "was also deduced by looking in the mirror", being the product of a sudden realization of Western weakness and vulnerabilities when faced with an increasingly uncertain and volatile environment and an opponent eager and ready to exploit it.

NATO was the first to develop an approach towards Hybrid Warfare. Differentiated perceptions of hybrid were surfaced by NATO experts, against the established term which should be seen as just another form of warfare in the 21st century, where an adversary can use every mean in its power and Hybrid should not definitely be put on a pedestal. In addition, Hybrid Warfare was an opportunity for the military defence planners to remain relevant, to remain involved in NATO defence planning and in crisis response measures and to guarantee for the military a sustained level of attention. The officials acknowledged, that NATO was seeing Hybrid as "a form of warfare aiming to destabilize and make a country more attackable", providing at the same time "a useful, holistic understanding of the security challenges from both the East and the South" and tools for a comparative strategic perspective while allowing for a differentiated response.

Nevertheless, NATO's approach to hybrid seems largely connected to a previously "dominating term", known as "Comprehensive Approach", a by-product of Alliance's experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan. During these crises, NATO recognised that the military cannot resolve crisis or conflict by itself. Achieving acceptable and sustainable solutions requires capabilities that the military alone cannot provide. A comprehensive political, civilian, and military approach is necessary to effectively manage today's complex crises. NATO's Comprehensive Approach therefore can be understood as a concept, philosophy, or mind-set rather than a documented process or capability. It is also better to speak of "a" Comprehensive Approach instead of "the" Comprehensive Approach. Moreover, NATO decided to not develop and publish any definition on what Comprehensive Approach exactly is, not to claim ownership. Even NATO SECGEN Stoltenberg in its effort to achieve continuity to NATO's Adaptation efforts stated that "hybrid is the dark reflection of our Comprehensive Approach" and started talking about "preparing for, deterring and defending against" Hybrid Warfare.

Following the three "Ds" rule, although with Dialogue or Collective Defence, the first two "Ds" there were clear Guidance and Plans, with Deterrence the third "D" the situation was more complicated. Hybrid was assessed as less deterrable and deterring Hybrid as such, not really useful for the Alliance. To this end, the new idea of "Deterrence by denial" was established within NATO. This concept is based on reducing the perceived benefit of an action by hardening the defence and making unbearable for the opponent the cost of a potential attack. This form of "Deterrence by denial" although initially counterproductive and costly, is expected to bring better results than the low success possibilities of "Deterrence by punishment", another form which aims to persuade the adversary that the cost of achieving its objective will be prohibitive. All these second thoughts make finally another form of deterrence, "Deterrence-by-resilience" the new, logical, and natural choice for Hybrid Warfare NATO's defence planning.

Cyber attacks, one of the main tools of the Hybrid toolbox made the Allies to realize the importance of resilience. In addition to the survivability of governments and the endurance of state mechanisms, the re-

silience of critical infrastructure, services and societies, all these are very important taskings because they complement NATO's Military Mobility. This is a common NATO-EU super project guaranteeing fast mobility and deployment of Allied troops throughout EU and NATO territory in order to counter any aggression, Hybrid or Conventional.

In addition, NATO developed guidelines to enhance national resilience and established a new civil-military Intelligence Division in NATO HQ in Brussels, in order to persuade Allies to share intelligence, which is a paramount factor for the identification, understanding, knowledge and anticipation of Hybrid Threats.

In sum, NATO's approach and reaction to Hybrid Threats and Warfare can be described as military – centric, pragmatic, not over obsessed by the nature of Hybrid threats, based on and sustaining Comprehensive Approach and finally protecting Allied Solidarity and Cohesion which are the Allied Centers of Gravity.

At the same time, and in the same geopolitical landscape, another international actor appeared to be particularly better fit for addressing Hybrid, namely the European Union.

In general, the EU keeping as always distances from whatever has to do with the military, avoided the term Hybrid Warfare and preferred the phrase Hybrid Threats. The usual lack of coherence was obvious when the Union failing to agree to a definition, started crafting a number of policy responses, based on a video released by the Council of the EU in which "Hybrid Threats" were described as "a combination of military and non-military means having the objective to destabilize opponents, create confusion, mask the real situation on the ground and hamper decision-making. To understand the EU's relaxed approach to Hybrid Threats, one should have in mind that already in 2015, the then EU HR/VP Federica Mogherini called them "the new normal". During the same period a few member-states started drafting non-papers on Hybrid, focusing on different issues. So, the Nordic Group non-paper was focusing on Russia, the French one on the Southern flank and the Finish non-paper on resilience. The Latvian and Luxembourgish EU Presidencies drafted background notes providing context and recommendations on possible ways forward, following a tasking to Crisis

Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) of EEAS (European External Action Service) to draft an initial paper for discussion, circulated in May 2015.

Officially, however, the process started with the invitation in May 2015 of the Foreign Affairs Council to the European Commission and HR/VP to draft a joint framework on Hybrid Threats "with actionable proposals". The EU sought to take all member states' concerns into consideration and as always, this all-inclusive approach led to confusion within the Union. The inability to provide a clear definition was called "need for flexibility", while the then CMPD Director stated that "hybrid is "just a bumper-sticker" and there is no need for a definition…as long as we know what we mean by it". Within the same context, the CMPD stated in an early document in a surprising for the EU clear and pragmatic way, that

"Hybrid warfare can be more easily characterized than defined, as a centrally designed and controlled use of various covert and overt tactics, enacted by military and/or nonmilitary means, ranging from intelligence and cyber operations through economic pressure to the use of conventional forces."

Eventually, the CMPD prominence in shaping the EU's overall response to Hybrid Warfare resulted to an approach similar to NATO. CMPD authors argued that "hybrid attacks are designed to exploit country's vulnerabilities" and can "generate ambiguity both in the affected population" as well as internationally with the "aim to swamp a government". This emphasis on vulnerabilities leads directly to the issue of "building resilience" and finally on "how the EU see its role in countering them"

Although there is no doubt that the EU is better than any other organization placed to counter Hybrid Threats, the EU officially recognized that "responding to and countering them, is and will remain national responsibility", and the Union's role is described as a platform for harmonizing responses on specific issues as well as providing added value on awareness, resilience and response.

This EU's approach to countering Hybrid Threats materialized in April 2016 when the Council welcomed the Joint Communication on coun-

tering Hybrid Threat and fostering resilience of the EU and its MS as well as Partners" and invited the Commission and the HR/VP "to provide a report by July 2017 to assess progress" on the topic, highlighting "the need for closer dialogue, coordination and cooperation with NATO".

In July 2016, following the bold launching of the EU Global Strategy, the leadership of the EU together with the Secretary General (SECGEN) of NATO signed in Warsaw a Joint Declaration with a view to give new impetus and new substance to the EU-NATO strategic partnership. Two years later in 2018, the leaderships of EU and NATO signed a second Joint Declaration in Brussels calling for swift and demonstrable progress in implementation.

The Declarations outlined 74 concrete actions in seven areas where cooperation between the two organizations should be enhanced. One of these areas is "Countering Hybrid Threats" including 10 concrete actions. Five progress reports have been submitted highlighting main achievements and added value of EU-NATO cooperation in different areas.

The studying of these documents is essential for the understanding of EU's and NATO's reaction to Hybrid as well as the cooperation between them. To this end the EU identified three steps:

- Awareness
- Resilience
- Response

The first step of the EU reaction to Hybrid Threats involves "improving awareness" and a key element of this is establishing a clear understanding of exactly what Hybrid Threats are, and how they differ from non-Hybrid ones accepting that not all contemporary Threats are Hybrid and avoiding thus the usual "constructive ambiguity". The flagship initiative to address the ambiguity of Hybrid was the creation of an "EU Hybrid Fusion Cell" within the "EU Intelligence and Situation Centre" in Brussels in order to:

- See the patterns of a Hybrid Campaign in intelligence provided by MS and EU Bodies.

- Cooperate with NATO.
- Provide top EU decision-makers with better situation awareness.

Moving to the second and the third steps of EU's reaction to Hybrid Threats we identify "resilience" and the "response as appropriate". The multi-layered and multi-faceted nature of this kind of threats calls for an equally multi-pronged response, theoretically embracing the widest range of actions, with a view to "build resilience" and "respond to attacks".

The first approach on countering Hybrid Threats has mainly been military-centric, and this is valid especially in the context of NATO. However, the non-military and predominately unconventional nature of this kind of Threats arguable require their tackling to be done through non-military means and civilian approach. Most importantly, in an EU context, it is the mix and continuity of external and internal security policies and instruments, which is likely to provide the most appropriate response.

EU therefore needs specific kind of policy based on the balanced use of Smart Power. It was initially known as EU Comprehensive Approach Policy, not to be confused with NATO's policy with the same name. Later became known as "Integrated Approach Policy to Conflicts and Crises" and became a strategic priority for EU external action. It entails a more coherent use of the various policies and instruments at the disposal of the EU, ranging from conflict prevention and diplomacy, security and defence to development, governance, humanitarian aid, trade and finance. As these policy domains are under the remit of various EU bodies and institutions, implementing the Integrated Approach requires a high degree of coordination, while also respecting different mandates, roles, legal frameworks and chains of command. In operational terms, any EU-wide response Policy would need to feature responsibilities and identify synergies among four sets of actors and/or instruments:

- Member States (MS) instruments and activities.
- EU internal security instruments (security, justice etc.).
- EU external security instruments including CSDP Civilian or Military Operations and Missions.

- NATO activities on the same issue or area.

Exploring the idea of deterrence which should be included in EU responses to Hybrid Threats, the focus here remains again in resilience. Although the EU officially is not mentioning deterrence and unofficially the EU people announce that “we do not deter”, several elements do point to this direction. Deterrence–like signaling can easily be identified in the possible invocation by any MS of the Article 42-7 of the Treaty of the EU requesting “Mutual Assistance” in case of multiple serious Hybrid Threats constituting armed aggression against this same MS (as happened in 2016 with France following the terrorist attacks in Paris). This can be easily assessed as “Deterrence by Resilience” or “Deterrence by Mutual Assistance”. In another area, “Deterrence by Resilience” through increased cooperation with NATO, was observed in the coordinated NATO-EU response at the refugee crisis in the Aegean Sea in 2016, with the objects of resilience being mainly Greece and the rest of the EU MS adjacent to the area or at the end of the “refugee corridor” in Austria, Germany or Sweden.

Overall, although the EU indeed, for obvious soul-saving political reasons does not subscribe openly to the Deterrence concept, this does not mean that it will not signal its “Deterrence by Denial”, when necessary, by using the proper denial toolbox, which includes its main Hard Power Tools which are the economic sanctions and political and diplomatic measures.

To conclude, the EU’s response to Hybrid Threats can be seen as a mix of existing measures together with new attempts to improve situational awareness and protect vulnerabilities. Although the first line will likely (and maybe should) remain with MS, the EU needs to demonstrate its added value when it come to improving awareness, building resilience and responding to attacks. The response should include:

- The development of various sectoral strategies (most of them delivered already) like maritime, or cyber-security, and finally a broader “Global Strategy” as happened in 2016.
- The existing national policies combined with cooperation at EU level at the sectors of law enforcement, border control, anti-drug, anti-trafficking, anti-terrorism and intelligence sharing.

- Possible EU initiatives aimed at capacity building in third countries or disrupting hostile activities whenever they take place.
- Synchronization of all these aspects, in a tailor-made fashion.

While NATO-EU cooperation outside the “Berlin Plus” arrangements is mired by political obstacles, in the context of Hybrid Warfare a new dynamic of engagement has emerged. Due to a perceived urgency, MS and Allies granted more space to the Staff members of both organizations to improve cooperation, find synergies and progressively deepen their relationship. Despite the slow progress and the ups and downs of formal EU-NATO cooperation, Hybrid set the tone for closer NATO-EU Institutional contacts. To this end, NATO has been engaged in mostly unofficial talks with the EU, in four different areas:

- Civil-military planning.
- Cyber Defence.
- Information-Sharing.
- Strategic Communications.

The migration crisis of 2015-2016 in the Aegean Sea was not only a real test of the EU-NATO cooperation in emerging crises, but also an important and clear symbolism with serious impact on European public opinion on how the two organizations can face crises together. Seen as a “key test of relevance” for the Alliance it led to NATO engaging its naval assets in patrolling the Aegean Sea exchanging intelligence with the EU’s FRONTEX through liaison officers. NATO also launched Operation SEA GUARDIAN and supported mainly with assets and intelligence and still supporting, EUNAFORMED in its mandate at the Central Mediterranean.

Nevertheless, a fully fledged cooperation between NATO and EU is continuously impeded by the Cyprus-Turkey issue and recently by the Austria-Turkey issue. It can be said clearly that it is the sense of urgency created by Hybrid and especially by Russian actions in Ukraine which created the existing impetus in the official EU-NATO relationship.

Another aspect of this unofficial cooperation is linked to Centers of Excellence (COE). The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats is a network-based international and independent hub

for practitioners and experts based in Helsinki, Finland. The Hybrid COE focuses on responses to hybrid threats under the auspices of the European Union (EU) and NATO.

Hybrid COE is described as a 'do tank' that conducts training courses, exercises, hosts workshops to policymakers and practitioners, and produces white papers on hybrid threats, such as vulnerabilities in an electrical grid or possible exploitation of vaguely written legislation. The Centre was formally established in April 2017 inaugurated in October 2017 and allotted a budget of 1.5 million euros. The Hybrid COE includes now 31 participating states of NATO and the EU.

The Finish COE in order to accomplish its mission is allowed and able to cooperate with all the NATO COEs which deal with issues connected to Hybrid Threats. In addition, these connections have the potential to provide coordinated policy responses to both organizations, if this EU Centre together with all the other relevant NATO Centers will avoid the trap of “raising awareness from an academic point of view” and become clearly “operational” following the steps of the more “operational” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence COE in Estonia.

There is no doubt that Hybrid Warfare that has been around for more than 15 years has created confusion to the terminology of our vocabulary. The Hybrid terms deduced not only by “looking at the enemy” but also by “looking in the mirror”, led both EU and NATO to use Hybrid terminology to describe a changing security environment in which no clear policies could be openly defined. The Hybrid terms therefore are not about Russia, ISIS or weaponization of migration but rather seek to send a message of danger and urgency at a time of nominal peace. But the most important role of this modern terminology and of these patterns is to facilitate the understanding by our decision-makers and by our population of all the challenges deriving from the new networked security environment, and the observed power diffusion.

The crises and conflicts of the 21st century reflect a greater degree of convergence and complexity and require from everyone to keep an informed and open mind on the various modes of conflict that already exist or are about to appear. Within this context, it is very important to have options available if the red lines are crossed, the thresholds are over passed and the situation goes out of hand. These options should

mainly include solid military capabilities that will save the day and support, defend or impose your strategic goals as appropriate. If things go the harm's way, the Twitter or Microsoft Navy or the Facebook or Apple Air Force (to copy Thomas L. Friedman), are not capable enough and will not come to your rescue. Solid military capabilities and political will to use them are often necessary to support your Hybrid Warfare activity.

Concluding, turning again to NATO and the EU, Hybrid intensified and facilitated the need of both organizations to come and work closer together for the protection of their role, their interests, their assets, their citizens and their way of living.

HELLENIC MINISTRY OF DIGITAL GOVERNANCE

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EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE

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General (ret.) Mikhail Kostarakos

Former Chief of HNDGS – Former Chairman of EU Military Committee

ESDC Honorary Fellow

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- Origin and Definitions
- Hybrid Threats
- Hybrid Opponents
- EU and NATO
- Conclusions

NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception

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

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

SPEC FI:
THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

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LT Robert G. Walker, USN

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS

NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception

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WW I

WW II

WW III ?

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

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

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

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

"Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors. They incorporate a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder."

LTC (ret) Frank Hoffman, USMC

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- ✓ A set of MPECI tools and techniques.
- ✓ An effort of creating confusion and ambiguity on the origin, the nature and the aim of the threat.
- ✓ A difficulty to be identified as Hybrid until they are well underway.
- ✓ A synchronization of means in novel ways.
- ✓ A capacity of keeping the level of hostility below any threshold of conventional war .

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- Aiming to specific effects, such as human casualties, decision changing, government swap, social or economic destruction, altered public perception etc.

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- **Military or Paramilitary forces**
- **Insurgent groups or Guerilla Units**
- **Mercenaries or Foreign Intel.services**
- **Political movements**
- **Criminal organizations**
- **Transnational Corporations**
- **News media**
- **Idealists - Activists- Amateur hobbyists**
- **Foreign Fighters**
- **Religious movements**

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"..Our approaches are to be based on intellectual superiority, asymmetrical and less costly…"

"Permanent Hybrid War"



"Gerasimov Doctrine"

NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception

OUTLINE

- Origin & Definition
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High level of expertise and
Perfect management of fear and terror.

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China's "three" Warfare Concept:
1. Media 2. Psychological 3. Legal

FIGURE 2: WAR, QUASI-WAR, AND NON-WAR, AS EXPRESSED IN A PLA TEXT FROM 2009.

Chinese Conception of Military Operations



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OUTLINE

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Turkish Hybrid tools: The three Ms

Military

Migrants

Mosques

NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception



A Hybrid invasion: Migrants, Military and "Casus Belli"

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Hybrid Warfare =

- **Looking at the enemy, and/or**
- **Looking in the mirror**

NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception



NATO for Hybrid : A form of Warfare aiming to destabilize and make a country more attackable

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The three Ds rule:

- ✓ Dialogue
- ✓ Defence
- ❖ "Deterrence (for NATO)
  - by denial"
  - by punishment"
  - by resilience"

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OUTLINE

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Resilience important to counter Cyber attacks

MILITARY MOBILITY, the most Important PESCO Project.

New civ-mil INTELLIGENCE DIVISION in NATO HQ

NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception

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NATO's approach and reaction is :

- **military-centric, pragmatic,**
- **not over obsessed by the nature of HT,**
- **based on and sustaining Comprehensive Approach and**
- **protecting Allied Solidarity and Cohesion.**

OUTLINE

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Hybrid Threats
are a combination of military and non-military means having the objective to destabilize opponents, create confusion, mask the real situation on the ground and hamper decision-making.

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HR/VP Mogherini: "The new normal"

NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception

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CMPD Dir Gabor Iklody: "..just a bumber sticker.."

"Hybrid Warfare can be more easily characterized than defined, as a centrally designed and controlled use of various covert and overt tactics , enacted by military and/or nonmilitary means, ranging from intelligence and cyber operations through economic pressure to the use of conventional forces."

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Hybrid attacks are designed to exploit country's vulnerabilities and generate ambiguity both in the affected population, as well as internationally with the aim to swamp a government

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

Regarding Hybrid Threats ,
..responding to and countering them is and will remain national responsibility…

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

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

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✓ **Awareness**
✓ **Resilience**
✓ **Response**

Theme	Assessment
Situational awareness	
Concrete measures will be put in place by May 2017 to enhance staff-to-staff sharing of time critical information between the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and the relevant NATO counterpart	
Intensify relations among actors at staff level engaged in countering hybrid threats and strengthen cooperation, including: • In developing their approaches to operate in the domain of Publicly Available Information. • In developing collaboration with the Hybrid CoE in support of situational awareness.	
Strengthen cooperation at staff level on threat assessments.	

✓ **Creation of EU Hybrid Fusion Cell**

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

Integrated Approach Policy to Conflicts and Crises

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Integrated Approach Policy to Conflicts and Crises

Synergies are required among:

- EU Member States instruments and activities
- EU internal sec. instruments (security, justice,etc)
- EU external security instruments CSDP Ops-Msns
- NATO activities on the same issue or area.

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“Deterrence by Resilience” or
“Deterrence by Mutual Assistance” :

Art 42-7 of TEU: Mutual Assistance Clause

“Deterrence by Denial” ?

NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception

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Hybrid Response should include:

- ✓ The development of various sectoral strategies like maritime, and finally a broader "Global Strategy" (2016).
- ✓ The existing national policies combined with cooperation at EU level in law enforcement, border control,anti-drug-trafficking-terrorism and intel- sharing.
- ✓ Possible EU initiatives aimed at capacity building in third countries
- ✓ Synchronization of all these aspects, in a tailor-made fashion.

NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception

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- ❑Civil-military planning
- ❑Cyber Defence
- ❑Information Sharing
- ❑Strategic Comms

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EU Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats
31 Participating Countries – Budget : 1,5 M euros

Hybrid CoE

NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception



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

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Hybrid intensified and facilitated the need of NATO and the EU to come and work closer together for the protection of their role, their interests, their assets, their citizens and their way of living.

“NATO – EU: Hybrid Perception.”

Thank you for your attendance.

Questions?