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Orientation - Advanced Military Training Courses 2022

“Security Challenges and Military issues in the EU”

Thessaloniki – Brussels, 18 March 2022

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends,

Thank you very much for the invitation to participate in your Course. It's an honour and a privilege to participate in the mentoring team of the ESDC.

The Outline of my briefing is on the screen.

At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the global security situation deteriorated. International terrorism, growing waves of migration from Africa and Asia to Europe, climate change, and persistent human rights abuses, combined with political unrest, civil war, and terrorism have begun to have a serious impact on the security situation in Europe. The COVID pandemic has worsened the situation. Existing threats have been amplified and new threats added to existing ones, hybrid and asymmetric by definition, including misinformation, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, hybrid threats and warfare including cyber-attacks.

There is a long list of geopolitical challenges to the EU, being the sum of the geopolitical challenges of the Member States:

The ongoing crises in Libya, Syria, the Caucasus, Belarus, Afghanistan and most recently Ukraine represent serious concerns for the EU. This should be combined with the demographic boom in Africa, along with the general failure of governance in many countries, political instability and racial or religious conflicts in Asia and Africa. This difficult situation is directly affected by cable television, social media, and mobile telephony,

which "awakened young Africans and Asians citizens," and intensified the already existing waves of migration from the Middle East and North Africa.

But what is most worrying in the long run is the revisionist policies of Russia, Turkey and to some extent China, which are aggressively seeking a new role to revive their long-lost imperial past. These revisionist policies, which ultimately aim to seek not only a new international geopolitical dominant role, but also a new vital or living space (Lebensraum), falsify history and exploit the weak points of Western Democracies, move in parallel and roughly on the same lines of a common narrative on the injustice of the world against their own people who are blocked in the way to their destiny. These revisionist approaches eventually led to the formulation of aggressive strategies, like the one we witness in Ukraine.

Russia is trying to amend the post-Cold War Security Architecture in Europe by reclaiming the Soviet sphere of influence they lost in 1990 when the Soviet Union collapsed. It is clear to all the Europeans now that NATO is not threatening Russia. NATO was created against the USSR, but this was concluded in 1990. At that time, we started considering Russia a strategic partner and a reliable ally against terrorism, until Mr. Putin due to developments in Ukraine again, decided to send his troops to invade and occupy Crimea. The attitude of the international community changed overnight because it was made clear, that Russia had turned into a revisionist force threatening to expand its territory and influence at the expense of those of its neighbors, whom Moscow considered less powerful. The possible threat of NATO expansion up to the Russian borders, a defensive Russian narrative that began in 1995 became an easy excuse for Russia's expansion dreams and it was easy to be supported by the Russian propaganda mechanism.

I personally believe that the fact that concerns Putin more than the proximity to NATO borders is the possible connection or accession of Ukraine to the EU. Ukraine's immense resources and the unique potential of Ukrainian industrial and agricultural infrastructure with the support of the EU may turn Ukraine into a prosperous and rich country. A prosperous, democratic and state of Law Ukraine, however, threatens Putin's regime far more than NATO's controversial missiles, and its authoritarian political power grip will be put in danger, following a possible and maybe inevitable awakening of its people.

It is necessary however to clarify some very important points from the beginning. First and foremost, for the EU MS, national defence and security are national responsibilities. The MS have to be able to defend their own territory and their sovereignty. In order to be able to do so, 21 of the EU MS participate in NATO, which take responsibility of the

Collective Defense of its members. Collective Defence of Europe therefore is a NATO responsibility. This has not changed and will not change in the foreseeable future. But for Greece and Cyprus NATO and EU roles have completely different meaning: (1) Cyprus is not a NATO ally and therefore is not protected by NATO against any threat (2) Greece is a NATO ally but in a confrontation with Turkey NATO is not expected to take sides and therefore Greece is not protected either by the Alliance (3) EU remains the only “potential ally” for both countries.

Turkey the other revisionist force of the area is also a point of concern for the EU. The rising tensions and the confrontation of Turkey with Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea over the airspace, the territorial waters, the EEZ and lately the military status of the islands are well known. The delimitation of the continental shelf is the only difference with Turkey, officially recognized by Greece. The options offered again by the Turks to their opponents are always the same that the Turks offer to all their opponents: Concede or Fight, but in this occasion, the capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces make the whole problem complicated and dangerous for the Turkish deep state establishment. And they know it. On the other hand, one should always keep in mind that the borders under discussion are not exclusively Greek, but they are also EU borders. This is the main reason for the recent transformation of the Greek Turkish border and migration issues into EU Turkish issues, a development that made the Turks very unhappy.

Moving back to 2016, when the EU launched the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). With the adoption of this Strategy, the EU launched an ambitious and substantial two-fold effort. First line of effort was to upgrade itself to a credible global geopolitical player, providing security and stability to the MS protecting their interests. Second line of effort was to define new strategic tasks representing its new practical level of ambition, setting thus the foundation for the concept of Strategic Autonomy, although nowhere in the EUGS, this was clearly stated. In the EUGS, the main strategic tasks for the EU were described as follows: (1) Crisis Management, (2) Support to Partners and (3) Protection of Europe.

This protection of EU citizens mainly deals with health and law enforcement issues and therefore there are matters for law enforcement agencies, police, border guards, gendarmerie, coast guard, etc. but certainly not military issues. And this should always be kept in mind in order to avoid misunderstanding and confusion with NATO’s Collective Defence.

In order to achieve the objectives of this Strategy, a Policy known as the Integrated Approach Policy was developed and the EU, in order to implement it, relied on a large and

unique set of policy tools, from the political to the diplomatic sector and from economic to military power.

All this leads us to three important conclusions in the field of security:

1. The Security Situation as a whole is extremely complex and in our "ecosystem" the new threats and challenges cannot be addressed only through diplomatic means.
2. It is necessary to use all available means, negotiations and alliances to deal with on-going or possible crises, because none of our countries or our countries' coalitions or organizations have the strength or the resources to deal with them all alone.
3. Both the wider threats and the various geopolitical trends, as well as the pandemic, call for the strengthening of the EU's role as an international organization and a geopolitical player acting where necessary and effectively protecting its members.

We all agree that the EU is not a military organization, and we should never even think to allow this to happen. With the military being often absent when courses of action are discussed, there are problems with some of the EUMS or EU officials who think that they can endlessly negotiate with the other part, in order to convince them. Diplomatic exchanges and endless rounds of negotiations are just an empty shell if not backed by some meaningful form of Hard power military capabilities. It is generally accepted that all effective geopolitical negotiations in Hard power environment should always be backed by decisive military power and with the credible will to use it.

In the course of human history, no fight has ever been won only with diplomatic notes, media statements or euro checks to the opponents for that matter. To this end, the EU should dispose some kind of Hard power in order to play a serious geopolitical role.

The Union desperately needs a change in the Treaties as well as in its attitude, which will provide for the funding of military operations and a small, lean, and effective command and control structure that will allow the Union to plan and to conduct operations in crisis areas in order to protect and to defend our interests and the European way of living. This simple structure of EU Military Command and Control, will allow pre-determined ear-marked Rapid Reaction Forces Land or Naval Battle Teams under effective air cover to be deployed where the MS decide. The MPCC (Military Planning and Conduct Capability) Operations Headquarters, based in Brussels, is slowly moving towards taking on this role.

It should be more and more clear now to the EU establishment that no solutions to crisis can be reached without the proper use of the military tool and that makes the military not only one very important tool among the others in this unique and rich toolbox of the EU, but also a tool that has to be used when effective results are requested. This may sound as not enough in our tough world, but it is very important in the international rules-based order. Besides, we should not forget the two articles existing in the Treaties that could be invoked by a victim of aggression. I refer to Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (solidarity clause), and to Article 42.7 of the Treaty of the European Union (mutual assistance clause). This course of action, given the situation in the area, deserves further consideration by the political leaderships of various MS, Cyprus and Greece included.

In the meantime, we need to find somehow a way to protect EU citizens and interests. And this is how we try to do it by it using Smart Power substitutes for the missing Hard Power. EU's main Hard Power is the economic sanctions against various opponents instead of the military might. When these sanctions are combined with political, legal and diplomatic actions "for good or bad", then become Smart Power. We consider the EU as the "Queen of Smart Power". This is the ultimate weapon of the EU and should be used very carefully, but also very decisively against the troublemakers.

When dealing with military issues in the EU, we must start with the highest military body in the EU, the Military Committee. The EUMC is composed of the Heads of General Staff of the 27 EU Member States who meet in person every six months or through their Military Representatives in Brussels on a weekly basis, or even more frequently if required, in order to guarantee that the voice and military advice of the end-users of the military capabilities of the MS, ie their General Staffs, is taken into account by the EU institutions and political authorities.

The Chairman of the Military Committee is automatically the highest military official in the EU and is elected by secret ballot every three years by the 26 Chiefs of Defence (Danes do not vote). The Chairman is neither the Strategic Commander nor the head of the European Armed Forces, if they are ever created. The current Chairman is the Italian General Claudio Graziano who will be replaced on July 1, 2022, by the Austrian Chief of Defence, General Robert Berger.

Now, based on the EUGS and its new ambitious geopolitical approach and considering that our neighborhood is increasingly dynamic, the EU has started working on a number of concepts and projects related to security and stability. These new projects deriving from EUGS are the following:

- First, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence known as CARD. This is a map of what military means the EU Member States have in their inventory or intend to procure, which are available for EU purposes as well as how much the MS are willing to spend on defence. CARD confirms that the European defence landscape is characterised by fragmentation and lack of coordination which is costing the EU MS approximately 100 bn Euros per year. This problem must be solved as soon as possible.
- The next cornerstone project is the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), an equally useful tool for cooperation, which imposed very strict commitments on the participating MS. The MS however, never fully complied with what they have signed for, no matter that they did so voluntarily. 60 PESCO projects are ongoing each one being at a different level of maturity.
- For the first time in EU's history, the EU Budget, aka MFF (Multiannual Financial Framework), 2021-27 features a section on defence and security. In a radical break from the past, EU leaders have agreed on the much-needed financial basis for further EU defence cooperation and now the agreed EU budget includes the following defence items:
 - European Defence Fund (EDF): €7,014 billion – The most crucial and most important defence and security initiative undertaken by the EU, a special EU budget dedicated to research, development, and acquisition of defence technology in order to strengthen the technological and industrial base of European defence.
 - Military mobility: €1,5 billion – Military Mobility is the most important among PESCO projects. It is a strategic platform enabling the swift and seamless movement of military personnel and assets throughout the EU, whether by rail, road, air or sea. Although not openly admitted, this project is the cornerstone of EU-NATO cooperation, having a vast impact on NATO's capability to move through Europe.
 - European Peace Facility (EPF): €5 billion – A new, off-budget instrument to finance actions in the field of security and defence. This new instrument allows the EU for the first time to complement the activities of CSDP missions and operations in host countries with assistance measures, and to support partner military forces either by funding their operations or by supplying them with military equipment. On the screen are depicted the assistance measures that have already been decided for African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mozambique, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Mali.

These projects although very important are not the only ones. The EU once more is stepping up its capacity to advance peace and security in conflict-affected areas. In December 2021, it was announced that with a budget of almost 900 million Euros, the “Global Europe thematic programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention” will support actions with a global or trans-regional impact during the period of 2021-2027 by providing assistance to build capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness and addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats. Through this

programme the EU will contribute to the achievement of UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and it will be complemented by other tools such as European Peace Facility and CSDP missions and operations.

These projects give flesh to a new term recently coined, EU's Strategic Autonomy. The idea of this European strategic sovereignty is to "*avoid external dependencies in a new geopolitical context*". With this we don't mean autonomy from any nation or international organization, but autonomy to do something alone, if necessary. In the meantime, while many may dispute the term 'Strategic Autonomy' (the US being the first among them) there is a growing realisation that the EU must have a capacity to act without undue dependences in terms of capabilities, technologies, and political decision-making. To be more realistic and under the light of the tragic turn of events in Afghanistan and Ukraine, it is now clear that EU Strategic Autonomy isn't about Europe separating from the US; but about Europe being able to act when the US or NATO are uninterested, unwilling, or incapable to do so. And it is becoming increasingly easy to see scenarios in the Middle East or Africa where EU security and interests are in danger, but the US has little or no interest at all to act.

But not only this. Another turning point for the EU is ahead of us. It is called Strategic Compass and it was discussed the last months in Brussels. This will be the document that will update and upgrade the EUGS without cancelling it and will bring it up to today's global geopolitical requirements.

Despite the political hyperactivity in the field of security and defense since 2016, when the Global Strategy was agreed, it was realized that the new tools focus on the vast majority in the development of defense capabilities and only in the defense industry. Recent developments have forced the EU and the MS to realize to some extent that, as important as these two factors continue to be, there is a third factor that needs to be addressed. This is the EU's capacity for dynamic military engagement, even reacting precautionarily to crisis situations on the ground. This is the third leg of the tripod that complements Political Credibility in Decision Making and Strategic Autonomy. The Strategic Compass will obviously fill this gap and addresses four areas: Crisis Management, Sustainability, Capacity Building and Cooperation.

The work on this Strategic Compass, under the political control of the MS, is almost complete, with the presentation by the High Representative with the final approval by the European Council expected on 24-25 March 2022. However, the Strategic Compass is expected to be accompanied and by specialized packages of capabilities for the dominance or control of various defense sectors. In this context, as High Representative Borrell em-

phasized: "What we perceive as Defense in the classical sense is evolving and encompassing more and more sectors, especially cyberwarfare and space."

Space has become a strategic sector and a key factor for most of our daily activities such as the Internet or telecommunications. In addition, it plays a central role in security and defense. Therefore, we must guarantee our ability to operate safely and continuously with the infrastructure necessary for our societies, including threats from space. 13.2 billion euros have been allocated to the EU budget for the Space Program - which is the largest EU funding ever made. In February 2022, the European Commission proposed two new space initiatives:

1. The EU's Secure Connectivity System, which will ensure global access to secure and cost-effective satellite communications services and
2. The Space Traffic Management System (STM).

Turning now to the present situation. On the screen you can see where the EU is currently engaged, in three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia). I will not examine the great job and the results or the outcome of the eleven civilian missions and FRONTEX, but I will restrict myself only to military missions. As military, we are involved in three Executive Operations and four Non-Executive Missions.

The Operations include ALTHEA, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, contributing to a safe and secure environment, Operation ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, protecting vulnerable shipping from piracy at sea, and Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean, dealing with the implementation of the UN arms embargo at the high seas off the coast of Libya.

In January 2021, the EU Council launched the first pilot case of the new Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept in the Gulf of Guinea which is the area that accounts for 95% of maritime kidnappings in the world. France, Italy and Spain are already in the Gulf of Guinea providing naval and air support to support the pilot operation. In February 2022, the Council extended the operation in the Gulf of Guinea for a further two years until February 2024 and decided to launch a similar Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) operation in the North-West Indian Ocean from the Hormuz Straights to the South Tropics and from the North Red Sea to the centre of the Indian Ocean. The expansion of the CMP at the Indo-Pacific, as expected will be followed later by the East China Sea.

EU military training missions in Mali, the Central African Republic and Somalia, and most recently in Mozambique, provide training to the local armed forces and advice to their military leadership. Ongoing is the ongoing review of EU training missions, which is likely to make them stronger, evolving from a key training role to an effective advisory as well as an

accompanying role in combat missions. In this context and due to internal political developments, Russian intervention inside various countries but mainly after the execution of a military coup in Mali and the consequent rupture of France-Mali relations, the Training Mission in Mali may be suspended in the near future or will be moved to a nearby country. Russia's presence with Wagner's ubiquitous mercenaries complicates France's relations, mainly as a former colonial power and consequently the EU with the local governments of the Sahel and the Central African Republic to the south. Developments may shift the focus of the counter-terrorism struggle and perhaps the headquarters of the Training Mission from Mali to Niger. EUTM Mali's mandate expires in May 2024, which may need to be re-considered in the light of the French withdrawal.

Increasing the level of ambition for these missions, the need was recognized and in 2017 a separate executive and administrative structure was created, known as the Military Planning and Conducting Capability Cell (MPCC), which is actually a Brussels-based Operations Headquarters. within the EU Military Staff, which commands all of the above non-executive missions and is scheduled to take over the command of one or more operational missions in the future.

Turning now to the relationship between EU and NATO, the two organizations have to cooperate in order to promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Their relationship should be examined at three levels of debate: (1) Relationship and complementarity between the two organizations; (2) What the EU MS should be doing within NATO; and (3) The broader transatlantic bond which also includes the transatlantic relation with the US. This is not a zero-sum game, where putting more resources within the EU means taking them away from NATO but could be definitely a win-win situation for both Organisations. In fact, since strengthening the European pillar is also a clear strategic goal for NATO itself and a long-lasting demand by the US, then it is clear that the EU defence initiatives are not undermining NATO, but rather reinforcing it. NATO should concentrate on collective defence, while the EU should be in the lead for all crisis management, human security and human rights related issues. The key words of EU-NATO relationship are mutual reinforcement and burden sharing.

One of the most puzzling issues the EU faces is the relationship relations with China. China is at the same time a partner, for instance on climate action; a competitor, notably in economic terms; and a rival, with China actively promoting alternative forms of governance and expanding its sphere of influence. Although a very important Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) between EU and China was signed on 31 Dec 2020, relation with China is continuously deteriorated because of Chinese human rights violations.

This was the situation in the EU and its wider surroundings when the crisis broke out in Ukraine. As HRVP Borrell stated “With the invasion of Ukraine, we witness the return of war on European soil. We need to be more than a “soft power” and enhance our instruments to deter reckless adversaries.... To handle the wider impact of the war against Ukraine, we need to bolster European economic resilience, end our energy dependence on Russia and further strengthen European defence.”

Russia's outrageous attack on Ukraine was a shock, sending waves of fear, terror and unrest across the continent and into the global environment. Such an overt Policy and Use of Power threatens to create a world where the rules-based international order gives way to the laws of the jungle. We thought we had moved away from this jungle landscape of previous centuries and set out on a glade of understanding, respect and a civilized search for mutually beneficial solutions, but unfortunately Russia denied us.

We do not know when and how the conflict will end. But in recent days we have witnessed the belated birth of geopolitical Europe. The one we have been talking about for years: with a sense of purpose and using all means and leverage to support its political goals.

The EU acted extremely quickly and with unprecedented determination, breaking many taboos. Undoubtedly, we have gone further in a week than in decades of discussions. All this proves that when the crisis strikes, Europeans do come together and invoke and develop a strong collective will to defend their values and interests from any form of attack. The intention is to stand by Ukraine, not only in words but also in deeds. It seems that Europeans are ready to pay any price required, in addition to various economic measures and sanctions. The price to pay is the price of freedom.

EU also agreed within a few hours to use the EPF to bring financial support and to coordinate the efforts of the KM to supply weapons to the Ukrainian Army to help the country defend itself against Russian aggression. Another taboo fell. We have and we plan retaliation capacities. We have mobilized these capacities and we have to continue doing so, by pooling the capacities of the MS and the EU institutions.

As this is a full-scale war and Ukraine has every right to defend itself, we must support it with the means needed for this self-defense. We have decided to use the European Peace Facility to provide € 450 million worth of lethal weapons equipment and € 50 million in non-lethal supplies (such as fuel and protective equipment). These measures will be fully consistent with what the EU MS have already decided to do on a national basis. Another taboo fell. This is the first time the EU has provided lethal military equipment to a country. To this end, the HR/VP Borrell has set up within the EU Military Staff a Clear-

ing House Cell to liaise and support EU actors with the Ukrainian Armed Forces in matters relating to EU military assistance or from the various countries (MS or not) bilaterally and to ensure the timely promotion of any assistance available. European Heads of government decided also to offer to Ukraine additional financial assistance of 500 M euros.

Moreover, given Russia's unique capabilities in the Hybrid War and the fact that cyber operations are vital, the work of the PESCO Cyber Rapid Response Teams was activated so that the European Commission could provide equipment, software and other formats and assistance to strengthen cyber resilience in Ukraine.

At the same time, leaks to the European press point out that due to the developments in Ukraine changes have already been added and enforced in the about to be approved "Strategic Compass" document. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to a major change to this forthcoming EU military strategy document, with the security threat posed by Moscow's aggression dominating its latest version.

The new document criticizes Russia for "showing readiness to use the highest level of military force, regardless of legal or humanitarian considerations, combined with hybrid tactics, cyber-attacks and manipulation and intervention of foreign intelligence, energy coercion and offensive". The document also refers to "basic principles on which European security is built, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the founding documents of the OSCE, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris." These are the legal documents - which focus on the territorial integrity of states and borders, calling on states to refrain from the threat or use of force and clarifying the freedom of countries to choose or change their security arrangements, everything that has been challenged from Russia in the case of Ukraine.

"These principles are neither negotiable nor subject to revision or reinterpretation," the draft states. "In this context, our strategic cooperation with NATO and the collective defense it provides to the Allies is more important than ever for our Euro-Atlantic security." It is known that EU treaties prohibit the Union from using its regular multiannual budget to fund operations with military or defense implications. Under the new plans, it is confirmed that the EU will now use the extra-budgetary financial instrument we described before, EPF, with a ceiling of € 5 billion, in cases where specific military actions need to be funded immediately, and military assistance to be provided.

In terms of defense spending, the new draft of the Strategic Compass states that "it becomes urgent to spend more and in a better way" always in coordination between the MS and the EU. The EU is expected to "set targets for increased and improved defense

spending" by mid-2022, with the European Commission tasked with developing additional incentives for cooperative investment, such as the recent proposal to exempt MS from Value Added Tax (VAT) on the purchase of defense equipment produced in Europe, with the aim of promoting joint armaments projects.

This is a critical moment for the EU. It is also time for the European Union to discuss and decide what it wants to be in order to meet the challenges of the future, it must review many things such as the way of thinking, the processes, the methods, paying more attention to her ability to act, than to the endless internal discussions. The current tragic moment of the Ukrainian crisis must push EU to take this path further in order to protect lives, and to ensure the safety and well-being of all. This is the real challenge that must be faced in the immediate future.

To quote again HR/VP Josep Borrell: "We need to put more defense and security in our mentality and stop the theological debates about strategic autonomy. We can call it whatever we want, but we have to take our security into our own hands. This war will also force us to increase our defence spending. We need to spend more but above all we need to spend better.... This approach has nothing to do with weakening the transatlantic link, which, by the way is stronger than ever: in the current crisis, our transatlantic unity has been 100%.... If Europe wants to play a key role in shaping the post COVID-19 world, it must strengthen its internal cohesion and engage more effectively with all regions of the world.... To avoid being at the mercy of the others, needs to become a truly global actor. To enhance its power, Europe must strengthen its existing levers and look for new ones.... The Strategic Compass will provide a framework for using these additional military means in an efficient and coordinated way within the EU, ensuring full complementarity with NATO. With the European Defence Agency we will also analyze the structure of our military spending and the investment gaps and propose additional initiatives to strengthen the European defence industrial and technological base."

Concluding I would like to share with you my personal view: Europe is our home, and the EU is our family. A family always need protection. We need commitment at the highest political level to make the EU a stronger global security actor in a world of fast changing threats, in order to protect our principles, our interests, our people and our way of living.

Dear friends, we deserve a stronger Europe. Let's make it happen!

I stop here and I am ready for your questions.

European Security and Defence College

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General (ret.) Mikhail Kostarakos

Former Chief of HNDGS - Former Chairman of EUMC

OUTLINE


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- EU Global Strategy
- EU military tool
- EU's Smart Power
- EUMC-EUGS Projects
- Strategic Autonomy & Compass
- EU Operations and Missions
- EU – NATO/China Relationship
- Crisis in Ukraine
- Conclusions



OUTLINE

Challenges


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Dreaming of Long-Lost Imperial Past



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RUSSIA

IS TRYING TO AMEND THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE



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For the EU MS national defence and security are national responsibilities.

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
Conclusions



**Two options are always offered by Turkey:
Concede or Fight**

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EU Global Strategy

- ✓ **A reliable security provider**
- ✓ **New level of ambition**

Three Strategic Priorities:



respond to external conflicts and crises



build capacities of partners



protect EU and its citizens

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EU INTEGRATED APPROACH POLICY



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Security Conclusions.

- **The Security Situation as a whole is extremely complex. Threats and Challenges cannot be addressed only with diplomatic means.**
- **It is necessary to use all available means. None of our countries or organizations have the strength or the resources to deal with it all alone.**
- **The strengthening of the EU's role as an international organization and a geopolitical player is of paramount importance.**

➤ OUTLINE

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- Art. 42-7 of TEU: Mutual Assistance clause
- Art.222 of TFEU: Solidarity clause





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EU Military Committee (EUMC)

- **The Highest Military Body in the EU (27 Chiefs of Defence)**
- **It supervises and controls all military activities**
- **Provides Military Advice to the EU Political Authorities**
- **Chairman EUMC: GEN Claudio Graziano (ITA)**



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MILITARY
ECONOMIC



POLITICAL
DIPLOMATIC
LEGAL


ALL ACTIONS COMBINED

**European Union,
THE QUEEN OF “SMART POWER”**

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EUGS concepts and projects related to security and stability



CARD: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation

EDF: European Defence Fund

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Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)

- A map of EU Member States' **military means** for EU purposes
- **Lack of coordination** on European defence which costs **~100 bn Euros per year**
- 55 collaborative opportunities in capability development; 56 opportunities for R&T cooperation



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Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

- Supports **joint development; acquisition and deployment** of defence capabilities
- **25/27 MS** participate; **60 PESCO projects approved**
- **Military mobility (1.5 Bn €)** is a strategic platform enabling seamless military movement throughout EU



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Financial basis for further EU defence cooperation

- **European Defence Fund (EDF): 7.014 Bn €**
 - Special budget for R&D
- **Military Mobility: 1.5 Bn €**
- **European Peace Facility (EPF): 5 Bn €**
 - Instrument to finance actions in the field of security and defence



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European Peace Facility (EPF – 5 Bn euros) already decided Assistance Measures (in million euros):

❑ African Union,	130
❑ BiH,	10
❑ Mozambique,	40
❑ Georgia,	12.75
❑ Moldova,	7
❑ Ukraine,	31
❑ Mali.	24



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Global Europe thematic programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention: 900 Bn €

- **The 900 million euros programme will support actions with a **global or trans-regional impact** during the period of 2021-2027 by providing assistance to **build capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness and addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats****





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EU Strategic Autonomy

- Measures to **boost the EU's strategic sovereignty**
- To “**avoid external dependencies** in a new geopolitical context”
- Not autonomy *from* someone, but to do something **alone, if necessary**.



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EU Strategic Autonomy

- **It is now clear that EU Strategic Autonomy isn't about Europe separating from the US; but about Europe being able to act when the US or NATO are uninterested, unwilling, or incapable to do so**

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➤ Upgrade EUGS without cancelling it.

- Focus on:
- ✓ Defence capabilities Development
 - ✓ Defence Industry



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For EU's global role and higher security profile, three strategic/political factors are necessary:

- ✓ **Political credibility in decision making**
- ✓ **“Strategic Autonomy”**
- **Real – Dynamic troop deployment capabilities in time with the necessary organization of forces**



The Strategic Compass

- A **cornerstone document** to explain which security and defence responsibilities the EU wants to undertake; and through which executive and non-executive operations
 - ✓ Manage crises;
 - ✓ Enhance its resilience;
 - ✓ Develop capabilities and instruments; and
 - ✓ Build strategic partnerships.

Final adoption is expected in 24-25 March 2022



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The infographic features the European Union flag and logos for EUSPA and ESA at the top. The main title is 'EU SPACE PROGRAMME OVERVIEW'. Below the title, there are five columns, each with an icon, a program name, a description, and a key achievement:

Icon	Program Name	Description	Key Achievement
Eye icon	COPERNICUS	Earth Observation (EO) and monitoring based on satellite and non-space data	Nr.1 world provider of space data and information
Globe with location pin icon	GALILEO	Global satellite navigation and positioning system (GNSS)	10% of the EU GDP enabled by satellite navigation
Plane icon	EGNOS	Reliable navigation signals for safety of life use	Operational in 360+ airports & helipads in 23 countries
Satellite icon	SSA	Space situational awareness monitoring and protecting space assets	Providing surveillance and tracking services to 210+ satellites
Shield with satellite icon	GOVSATCOM	Secure satellite communications for EU security actors	Delivering rapid support over crisis areas

**For Space Programme:
13,2 Billion euros**

- 1. EU Secure Connectivity System**
- 2. Space Traffic Management system**




«What we perceive as Defence in the classical sense is evolving and encompassing more and more sectors, especially cyberwarfare and space.»
HRVP J. Borrell

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EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS



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EU Operations

ALTHEA



EUFOR

ATALANTA



IRINI



➤ Contributing in SASE in BiH

➤ Anti-piracy ops in the Horn of Africa

➤ Protection of vulnerable shipping



➤ Implementation of the UN arms embargo off the coast of Libya

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ΣΥΝΤΟΝΙΣΜΕΝΗ ΘΑΛΑΣΣΙΑ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑ – COORDINATED MARITIME PRESENCE (CMP)

- Can be implemented in any maritime area of the world;
- Uses existing EU MS assets present or deployed on a voluntary basis;
- Relies on enhanced coordination of assets, which remain under national command;



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EU Training Missions



MALI



**CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC**



SOMALIA



MOZAMBIQUE

- Capacity Building
- Training to the local Armed Forces
- Advice to local military leaderships



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MILITARY PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY (MPCC)

- Director General of the EU Military Staff (DG EUMS) & Director of MPCC



- A double-hatted three-star Flag Officer
- Reports to PSC - Informs EUMC



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EU-NATO relations: *Mutual reinforcement *Burden sharing

Three levels of debate:

1. Relationship and complementarity;
2. What the EU member should be doing within NATO;
3. Broader Transatlantic bond.



➤ OUTLINE


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EU-China relations

China is:

- ✓ **A partner** (i.e. on climate);
- **A competitor** (i.e. in economic terms); and
- ❖ **A rival** (i.e. in forms of governance and spheres of influence)
- Deterioration of relations despite recently signed **CAI** due to human rights violations.





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«With the invasion of Ukraine, we witness the return of war on European soil. We need to be more than a “soft power” and enhance our instruments to deter reckless adversaries.»

HRVP J. Borrell





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
«To handle the wider impact of the war against Ukraine, we need to bolster European economic resilience, end our energy dependence on Russia, and further strengthen European Defence.»

HRVP J. Borrell



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


In recent days we have witnessed the belated birth of geopolitical Europe. The one we have been talking about for years: with a sense of purpose and using all means and leverage to support its political goals.



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The EU acted extremely quickly and with unprecedented determination, breaking many taboos. Undoubtedly, we have gone further in a week than in decades of discussions.



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The EU has decided to use the EPF to provide € 450 M worth of lethal weapons equipment and € 50 M in non-lethal supplies. These measures will be fully consistent with what the EU MS have already decided to do on a national basis. Another taboo fell. This is the first time the EU has provided lethal military equipment. Additional 500 M € will be provided as well.

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Cyber Rapid Response Teams





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The EU principles – challenged by Russia in the case of Ukraine – are neither negotiable nor subject to revision or reinterpretation.



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The current tragic moment of the UKR crisis must push EU to take this path further in order to protect lives and to ensure the safety and well being of all. THIS IS THE REAL CHALLENGE.



«...We need to put more defence and security in our mentality and stop the theological debates about Strategic Autonomy. We can call it whatever we want but we have to take our security into our own hands. This war will also force us to increase our defence spending. We need to spend more but above all we need to spend better...»

HRVP Josep Borrell



“ ...This approach has nothing to do with weakening the transatlantic link, which, by the way is stronger than ever: in the current crisis, our Transatlantic unity has been 100%..... If Europe wants to play a key role in shaping the post COVID-19 world, it must strengthen its internal cohesion and engage more effectively with all regions of the world...”

HRVP Josep Borrell



“ ...To avoid being at the mercy of the others, EU needs to become a truly global actor. To enhance its power, Europe must strengthen its existing levers and look for new ones....”

HRVP Josep Borrell



The Strategic compass will provide a framework for using these additional military means in an efficient and coordinated way within the EU, ensuring full complementarity with NATO.

With the EDA we will also analyze the structure of our military spending and the investment gaps, and propose additional initiatives to strengthen the European defence industrial and technological base.

HRVP J. Borrell



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Conclusions

- ✓ **Europe is our home and the EU is our family.**
- ✓ **We need commitment at the highest political level to make the EU a stronger security actor.**
- ✓ **My personal view: We deserve a stronger Europe.**
- ✓ **Let's make it happen!!!**

“Security Challenges and Military Issues in the EU”



Questions?