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**JEAN MONET PROJECT EUVADIS: ENHANCING THE DEBATE
ABOUT INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE, EU VALUES AND DIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF MACEDONIA**

“EU Security Watch-spot”

“The Way Ahead of the European Security and Defence Policy”.

Thessaloniki, 13 January 2022

Dear Professor (Professor Fotini Bellou, Head of the EU Security Watch spot (JM EUVadis project),

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends,

Thank you very much for the invitation to participate to your Conference. It's an honour and a privilege. The Outline of my briefing is on the screen.

There is a long list of geopolitical challenges for the EU. The list is always the sum of the geopolitical challenges to the individual member states. But not exclusively. The ongoing crises in Libya, in Syria, in Caucasus, in Ukraine, in Afghanistan, in Belarus constitute points of concern for the EU. But what is more troubling in the long run is the behavior of China, Russia and Turkey, which aggressively seek a new role reviving their long-lost imperial past. Especially Turkey, which violates the sovereign rights of two MS, Greece and Cyprus in the East Mediterranean and in the Aegean Sea,

seriously affects Europe's security situation. To make things worse, developments in Afghanistan, combined with the demographic explosion in Africa, along with the failure of governance, political instability and civil racial or religious conflicts in many remote countries in Asia and Africa, always affected by cable TV, social media, and mobile telephony, which "awakened African and Asian young citizens", created new or intensified the already existing waves of migration from the Middle East and North Africa.

Summing up, for the EU the main challenges besides the ones NATO is dealing with, are terrorism, hybrid and cyber, climate change, COVID-19, uncontrollable dissemination of WMD and illegal migration for the reasons that were already explained.

It is necessary however to clarify some important points from the beginning. First and foremost, for the EU MS, national defence and security are national responsibility. The MS have to be able to defend their own territory and their sovereignty. In order to be able to do so, against a stronger or more capable threat, 21 of the EU MS participate in NATO, which take responsibility of the Collective Defense of its members. Collective Defence of Europe therefore is a NATO responsibility. This has not changed and will not change in the foreseeable future. But for Greece and Cyprus NATO and EU roles have completely different meaning: (1) Cyprus is not a NATO ally and therefore is not protected by NATO against any threat (2) Greece is a NATO ally but in a confrontation with Turkey NATO is not expected to take sides and therefore Greece is not protected either by the Alliance (3) EU remains the only "potential ally" for both countries.

This was the situation when in 2016 the EU launched the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). With the adoption of this Strategy, the EU has launched an ambitious and substantial two-fold effort. First line of effort was to upgrade itself to a credible global geopolitical player, providing security and stability to the MS protecting their interests. Second line of effort was to define new strategic tasks representing its practical level of ambition, setting thus the foundation for the concept of Strategic Autonomy, although

nowhere in the EUGS, this was clearly stated. In the EUGS, the main strategic tasks for the EU were described as follows: (1) Crisis Management, (2) Support to Partners and (3) Protection of Europe.

This protection of EU citizens mainly deals with health and law enforcement issues and therefore are matters for law enforcement agencies, police, border guards, gendarmerie, coast guard, etc. but certainly not military issues. And this should always be kept in mind.

I will not get into details about the rising tensions and the confrontation between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea over the airspace, the territorial waters, the EEZ and lately the military status of the islands and the delimitation of the continental shelf, which is the only difference with Turkey officially recognized by Greece. The options offered again by the Turks are the same offered to all their opponents: Concede or Fight, but in this occasion, the capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces make the whole problem complicated and dangerous for the Turkish establishment. And they know it. On the other hand, one should always keep in mind that the borders under discussion are not exclusively Greek but they are also EU borders.

We all agree that the EU is not a military organization, and we should never even think to allow this to happen. With the military being often absent when courses of action are discussed, there are problems with some of the EUMS or EU officials who think that they can endlessly negotiate with the other part, in order to convince them. Diplomatic exchanges and endless rounds of negotiations are just an empty shell if not backed by some meaningful form of Hard power military capabilities. It is generally accepted that all effective geopolitical negotiations in Hard power environment should always be backed by decisive military power and with the credible will to use it. In the course of human history, no fight has ever been won only with diplomatic notes, media statements or euro checks to the opponents for that matter. To this end, the EU should dispose some kind of Hard power in order to play a serious geopolitical role. The Union desperately needs a change in the Treaties as well as in its attitude, a change that will provide

for the funding of military operations and a small, lean, and effective command and control structure that will allow the Union to plan and to conduct operations in crisis areas in order to protect and to defend our interests and the European way of living. Eventually things are changing towards this direction.

It should be more and more clear now to the EU establishment that no solutions to crisis can be reached without the proper use of the military tool and that makes the military not only one very important tool among the others in this unique and rich toolbox of the EU, but also a tool that has to be used when effective results are requested. However, with defence planning and capabilities being under national control and at national level, European cooperation in security and defence issues is often impeded. There is a long way ahead of us. The EU has the political strength that comes from the common political will of the 27 member states. The unanimous rule for defence and external policy decisions is an extremely powerful feature of the EU and should never change. This may sound as not enough in our tough world, but it is very important in the international rules-based order. Besides, we should not forget the two articles existing in the Treaties that could be invoked by a victim of aggression. I refer to Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (solidarity clause), and to Article 42.7 of the Treaty of the European Union (mutual assistance clause). This course of action, given the situation in the area, deserves further consideration by the political leaderships of various MS, Cyprus and Greece included.

In the meantime, we need to find somehow a way to protect EU citizens and interests. And this is how we try to do it by it using Smart Power substitutes for the missing Hard Power.

EU's main Hard Power are the economic sanctions against various opponents instead of the military might. When these sanctions are combined with political, legal and diplomatic actions "for good or bad", then become Smart Power. We consider the EU as the "Queen of Smart

Power”. This is the ultimate weapon of the EU and should be used very carefully, but also very decisively against the troublemakers.

Now, based on the EUGS and its new ambitious geopolitical approach and considering that our neighborhood is increasingly dynamic, the EU has started working on a number of concepts and projects related to security and stability. These new projects deriving from EUGS are the following:

- First, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence known as CARD. This is a map of what military means the EU Member States have in their inventory or intend to procure, which are available for EU purposes as well as how much the MS are willing to spend on defence. CARD confirms that the European defence landscape is characterised by fragmentation and lack of coordination which is costing the EU MS approximately 100 bn Euros per year. This problem must be solved as soon as possible.
- The next cornerstone project is the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), an equally useful tool for cooperation, which imposed very strict commitments on the participating MS. The MS however, never fully complied with what they have signed for, no matter that they did so voluntarily. 60 PESCO projects are ongoing each one being at a different level of maturity.

For the first time in EU’s history, the EU Budget, aka MFF (Multiannual Financial Framework), 2021-27 features a section on defence and security. In a radical break from the past, EU leaders have agreed on the much-needed financial basis for further EU defence cooperation and now the agreed EU budget includes the following defence items:

- European Defence Fund (EDF): €7,014 billion – The most crucial and most important defence and security initiative undertaken by the EU, a special EU budget dedicated to research, development, and acquisition of defence technology in order to strengthen the technological and industrial base of European defence.

- Military mobility: €1,5 billion – Military Mobility is the most important among PESCO projects. It is a strategic platform enabling the swift and seamless movement of military personnel and assets throughout the EU, whether by rail, road, air or sea. Although not openly admitted, this project is the cornerstone of EU-NATO cooperation, having a vast impact on NATO's capability to move through Europe.
- European Peace Facility (EPF): €5 billion – A new, off-budget instrument to finance actions in the field of security and defence. This new instrument allows the EU for the first time to complement the activities of CSDP missions and operations in host countries with assistance measures, and to support partner military forces either by funding their operations or by supplying them with military equipment. On the screen are depicted the assistance measures that have already decided for African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mozambique, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Mali.

These projects although very important are not the only ones. The EU once more is stepping up its capacity to advance peace and security in conflicted-affected areas. In December 2021, it was announced that with a budget of almost 900 million Euros, the “Global Europe thematic programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention” will support actions with a global or trans-regional impact during the period of 2021-2027 by providing assistance to build capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness and addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats. Through this programme the EU will contribute to the achievement of UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and it will be complemented by other tools such as European Peace Facility and CSDP missions and operations.

These projects give flesh to a new term recently coined, EU's Strategic Autonomy. The idea of this European strategic sovereignty is to “*avoid external dependencies in a new geopolitical context*”. With this we don't mean autonomy from any nation or international organization, but autonomy to do something alone, if necessary. In the meantime, while many may dispute the term ‘Strategic Autonomy’ (the US being the first among them) there is a growing realisation that the EU must have a capacity to act without undue

dependences in terms of capabilities, technologies, and political decision-making. To be more realistic and under the light of the tragic turn of events in Afghanistan, it is now clear that EU Strategic Autonomy isn't about Europe separating from the US; but about Europe being able to act when the US or NATO are uninterested, unwilling, or incapable to do so. And it is becoming increasingly easy to see scenarios in the Middle East or Africa where EU security and interests are in danger, but the US has little or no interest at all to act.

But not only this. Another turning point for the EU is ahead of us. It is called Strategic Compass and it was discussed the last months in Brussels. This will be the document that will update and upgrade the EUGS without cancelling it and will bring it up to today's global geopolitical requirements.

Despite the political hyperactivity in security and defence since 2016 when GS was agreed, we realized that the new tools overwhelmingly focus on defence capability development and on the defence industry only. It seems to me now that the EU as well as the MS have realized to a certain extent, that as important as these two factors continue to be, there is a third factor that needs to be addressed; that is the capability for dynamic military engagement, reacting even pre-emptively on crisis situations on the ground. This is the third leg of the tripod complementing Political Credibility in decision-making and Strategic Autonomy. What happened in Kabul last August must never be forgotten and should not be repeated elsewhere and especially not in our area. The EU should not continue pretending that is possible to play a role in the geopolitical arena without having concrete dynamic action capabilities. Strategic Compass obviously will cover this gap. Decision by MS is expected in March this year.

Turning to the present situation. On the screen you can see where the EU is currently engaged, in three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia). I will not examine the great job and the results or the outcome of the eleven civilian missions and FRONTEX, but I will restrict myself only to military missions. As military, we are involved in three Executive Operations and four Non-Executive Missions.

The Operations include ALTHEA, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, contributing to a safe and secure environment, Operation ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, protecting vulnerable shipping from piracy at sea, and Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean, dealing with the implementation of the UN arms embargo at the high seas off the coast of Libya.

Within the same strategic approach, a new EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific was launched in April 2021, which recommits the EU politically to the region with the aim of contributing to its stability, security, prosperity and sustainable development. Nevertheless, there are more expectations from the EU political leadership. Last January, the EU Council launched the first pilot case of the new Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept in the Gulf of Guinea which is the area that accounts for 95% of maritime kidnappings in the world. The new CMP tool will further strengthen EU maritime security engagement and will be coordinated from Brussels. The expansion of the CMP at the Indo-Pacific has already been agreed and maybe later the East China Sea will follow. Greece and Cyprus should consider the possibility to propose and have agreed by the EU a further expansion of the CMP in other areas of Maritime Interest including the SE Mediterranean.

The EU Military Training Missions, in Mali, the Central African Republic Somalia and the latest in Mozambique, which were born to cover the Capacity Building objective, provide training to the local armed forces and advice to the respective military leadership.

Turning now to the relationship between EU and NATO, the two organizations have to cooperate in order to promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Their relationship should be examined at three levels of debate: (1) Relationship and complementarity between the two organizations; (2) What the EU MS should be doing within NATO; and (3) The broader transatlantic bond which also includes the transatlantic relation with the US. This is not a zero-sum game, where putting more resources within the EU means taking them away from NATO but could be definitely a win-win situation for both

Organisations. In fact, since strengthening the European pillar is also a clear strategic goal for NATO itself and a long-lasting demand by the US, then it is clear that the EU defence initiatives are not undermining NATO, but rather reinforcing it. NATO should concentrate on collective defence, while the EU should be in the lead for all crisis management, human security and human rights related issues. The key words of EU-NATO relationship are mutual reinforcement and burden sharing.

One of the most puzzling issues the EU faces is its relations with China. China is at the same time a partner, for instance on climate action; a competitor, notably in economic terms; and a rival, with China actively promoting alternative forms of governance and expanding its sphere of influence. Although a very important Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) between EU and China was signed on 31 Dec 2020, relation with China is continuously deteriorated because of Chinese human rights violations. AUKUS will definitely put its footprint on the EU-China relations, as they are directly connected with the EU-US relations, after AUKUS.

Concluding I would like to share with you my personal view:

Europe is our home, and the EU is our family. We need commitment at the highest political level to make the EU a stronger global security actor in a world of fast changing threats. As HRVP Borrell stated recently: *"If Europe wants to play a key role in shaping the post COVID-19 world, it must strengthen its internal cohesion and engage more effectively with all regions of the world....To avoid being at the mercy of the others, needs to become a truly global actor. To enhance its power, Europe must strengthen its existing levers and look for new ones"*

We deserve a stronger Europe. Let's make it happen!

I stop here and I am ready for your questions.

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“EU Security Watch – spot”

“The Way Ahead of the European Security and Defence Policy”



General (ret.) Mikhail Kostarakos

Former Chief of HNDGS - Former Chairman of EUMC

OUTLINE



Jean Monnet

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- ❑ EU-NATO Credits
- ❑ EU Global Strategy
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- ❑ EU's Smart Power
- ❑ EUGS Projects
- ❑ Strategic Autonomy & Compass
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


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Dreaming of Long-Lost Imperial Past



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
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TERRORISM



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**For the EU MS national defence and security
are national responsibility**

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EU Global Strategy

- ✓ A reliable security provider
- ✓ New level of ambition

Three Strategic Priorities:



respond to external
conflicts and crises



build capacities of partners



protect EU and its citizens

OUTLINE

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EU's Smart Power



EUGS Projects

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**Two options are always offered by Turkey:
Concede or Fight**

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- Art. 42-7 of TEU: Mutual Assistance clause
- Art.222 of TFEU: Solidarity clause



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MILITARY
ECONOMIC



POLITICAL
DIPLOMATIC
LEGAL

ALL ACTIONS COMBINED

**European Union,
THE QUEEN OF “SMART POWER”**


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EUGS concepts and projects related to security and stability



CARD: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation

EDF: European Defence Fund

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Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)

- A map of EU Member States' **military means** for EU purposes
- **Lack of coordination** on European defence which costs **~100 bn Euros per year**
- 55 collaborative opportunities in capability development; 56 opportunities for R&T cooperation



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Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

- Supports **joint development; acquisition and deployment** of defence capabilities
- **25/27 MS** participate; **60 PESCO projects approved**
- **Military mobility (1.5 Bn €)** is a strategic platform enabling seamless military movement throughout EU



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Financial basis for further EU defence cooperation

- **European Defence Fund (EDF): 7.014 Bn €**
 - Special budget for R&D
- **Military Mobility: 1.5 Bn €**
- **European Peace Facility (EPF): 5 Bn €**
 - Instrument to finance actions in the field of security and defence



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European Peace Facility (EPF – 5 Bn euros) already decided Assistance Measures (in million euros) :

<input type="checkbox"/> African Union,	130
<input type="checkbox"/> B & H,	10
<input type="checkbox"/> Mozambique,	40
<input type="checkbox"/> Georgia,	12.75
<input type="checkbox"/> Moldova,	7
<input type="checkbox"/> Ukraine	31
<input type="checkbox"/> Mali.	24



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Global Europe thematic programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention: 900 Bn €

- **The 900 million euros programme will support actions with a **global or trans-regional impact** during the period of 2021-2027 by providing assistance to **build capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness and addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats****



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EU Strategic Autonomy

- Measures to **boost the EU's strategic sovereignty**
- To “**avoid external dependencies** in a new geopolitical context”
- Not autonomy *from* someone, but to do something **alone, if necessary**.

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➤ Upgrade EUGS without cancelling it.

- Focus on:
- ✓ Defence capabilities Development
 - ✓ Defence Industry



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**For EU's global role and higher security profile,
three strategic/political factors are necessary:**

- ✓ **Political credibility in decision making.**
- ✓ **“Strategic Autonomy”**
- **Real – Dynamic troop deployment capabilities in time with the necessary organization of forces**

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
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EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS



EUFOR



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ALTHEA



EUFOR

ATALANTA



IRINI




EU Operations

- Contributing in SASE in B-H
- Anti-piracy ops in the Horn of Africa
- Protection of vulnerable shipping
- Implementation of the UN arms embargo off the coast of Libya

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EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific



- Launched in April 2021
- Recommits the EU politically to the region


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COORDINATED MARITIME PRESENCE (CMP)



- Can be implemented in any maritime area of the world;
- Uses existing EU MS assets present or deployed on a voluntary basis;
- Relies on enhanced coordination of assets, which remain under national command;



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EU Training Missions



MALI



**CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC**



SOMALIA



MOZAMBIQUE

- Capacity Building
- Training to the local Armed Forces
- Advice to local military leaderships

OUTLINE

- ☐ Challenges
- ☐ EU-NATO Credits
- ☐ EU Global Strategy
- ☐ EU – GR – TU issues
- ☐ EU military tool
- ☐ EU's Smart Power
- ☐ EUGS Projects
- ☐ Strategic Autonomy
& Strategic Compass
- ☐ EU Ops & Msns
- ☐ **EU -NATO/China**
- ☐ **Relationship**
- ☐ Conclusions

EU-NATO relations: *Mutual reinforcement *Burden sharing

Three levels of debate:

1. Relationship and complementarity;
2. What the EU member should be doing within NATO;
3. Broader Transatlantic bond.



OUTLINE


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EU-China relations

China is:

- ✓ **A partner** (i.e. on climate);
 - **A competitor** (i.e. in economic terms); and
 - ❖ **A rival** (i.e. in forms of governance and spheres of influence)
-
- Deterioration of relations despite recently signed **CAI** due to human rights violations.



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Conclusions

- ✓ **Europe is our home and the EU is our family.**
- ✓ **We need commitment at the highest political level to make the EU a stronger security actor.**
- ✓ **My personal view: We deserve a stronger Europe.**
- ✓ **Let's make it happen!!!**



“ If Europe wants to play a key role in shaping the post COVID-19 world, it must strengthen its internal cohesion and engage more effectively with all regions of the world ...To avoid being at the mercy of the others, needs to become a truly global actor. To enhance its power, Europe must strengthen its existing levers and look for new ones”

HRVP Josep Borrell

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“The Way Ahead of the European Security and Defence Policy”



Questions?